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Grounded in the intersection between gender politics and electoral studies, this 
dissertation examines the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space (in the 
form of domestic violence, control over mobility, emotional abuse, and sexual 
harassment) on the propensity to vote. Using quantitative methods across four survey 
datasets concerning Lebanon, the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, this research 
concludes that cross-regionally, familial control over mobility reduces the propensity 
to vote among women. Conversely, mechanisms of empowerment such as education 
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Chapter 1: Incursions on Personal Space and Political 
Participation 
Introducing Personal Space to Politics 
 
Concerned with the mechanisms of bodily integrity, personal space, and the 
propensity to vote, this dissertation is grounded in the intersection between gender 
politics, electoral studies, and institutions. Defined as the preferred distance between 
one’s self and others, enjoying respect for one’s personal space is key to comfortable 
independent functioning in social settings (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; O’Connor et 
al., 1999; Lister 1997a). While this is commonly accepted in social interaction theory, 
the concept of personal space is not often linked to political behavior. However, this 
dissertation indicates that personal space is acutely relevant to the propensity to vote. 
Indeed, voting was once considered a male dominated enterprise. Though 
more egalitarian levels of political participation are emerging, worldwide, women 
tend to vote less often than men do (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). Indeed, in the 2010-
2014 World Values Survey Data1, men usually (though not always) reported higher 
levels of voter turnout. The four cases featured in this dissertation show varying 
degrees of gender-based turnout. 
 
 
   
                                                 
1 State-provided electoral data is not publicly available from Lebanon, Morocco, or Yemen. As such, 























Note: Above is a graph depicting gender-based breakdowns of voter turnout based on figures 
provided by the 2010-2014 World Values Survey. It appears that three out of the four cases, men 
reported voting more than women did, although by small margins. However, over-reporting in survey 
studies is often a common problem—for example, according to state-provided data in the United 
States, 53% of women voted in the 2012 presidential elections, while 47% of men did (Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research, 2012). 
  
 Typically, reduced female political participation is often attributed to the fact 
that women often have less access to empowering socio-economic assets, such as 
education, employment, and property, than do men (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; 
Inglehart and Norris, 2003a; Verba, S. Burns, N. and Schlozman, 1997). Though 
women have gained increased access to such resources, and their rate of political 
participation is increasing as a result, one dimension explaining the propensity to vote 





mechanisms that they produce on potential voters is the key question which is 
ultimately answered in this dissertation.    
Mechanisms of control over personal space are grounded in three bases of 
power: those related to institutions, those related to interactions in the public sphere, 
such as the workplace or the street), and those pertaining to the private sphere, most 
commonly in terms of the regulatory mechanisms of relationships salient within the 
home (Foucault, 1997; Turner, 2008; Morris, Silk, Steinberg, Myers, and Robinson, 
2007). Domestic abuse or dominance in the home both create not only a loss of 
personal space, but also a loss of the individual self, making independent decision-
making difficult, and harassment outside of the home creates increased levels of 
anxiety and withdrawal from the public sphere (Deveaux, 1994; Gruber, 1998; Sen, 
2001; Nussbaum, 2005; Khader, 2011). 
I posit that the effects of these mechanisms extend into political participation, 
as those who are alienated from the public sphere are less likely to develop social 
networks, secure employment, participate in associational life, make independent 
decisions, and thus, less likely to develop the civic skills necessary for political 
participation. This results in reduced levels of political agency. Ultimately, those who 











Theories of Subjugation and Repression 
 
The body is an individual’s most central operational power base (Beasley and 
Bacchi, 2000; Lister, 1997a). By that same token, power over the body is not only 
asserted by the individual, but also by society (Butler, 1999; Deveaux, 1994; 
Foucault, 1978). Social sources often sexualize the body, leading to its domination in 
the form of shame, insult, neglect, or abuse (Foucault, 1978; Butler, 1997).  All of 
these are violations of bodily integrity. 
The concept of bodily integrity emphasizes the inviolability over the body, 
and one’s authority over it (Patosalmi, 2009; Nussbaum, 2003). Inappropriate 
touching, obscene gestures, and similar sexualized insults are violations of bodily 
integrity, and receivers of such affronts often experience annoyance, fear, and anxiety 
(Barling, Rogers, and Kelloway, 2001). Chronic exposure to sexual harassment 
creates psychological distress and leads to social withdrawal (Richman et. al., 1999; 
Fitzgerald et. al., 1997). Sexual harassment also functions as a form of social 
discrimination, and makes it more difficult for women to be taken seriously (Gruber, 
1998). These findings are made in reference to the psychological impact of 
transgressions against bodily integrity, but none link these dynamics to political 
behavior and participation.  
Based at the crux of social justice and human development, the capabilities 
approach to addressing socio-political inequity is concerned with what people are 





the first is the effective freedom to perform an action, and the second is the desire to 
do so (Alkire, 2002; Sen, 2009). Effective freedom is defined as the actual (as 
opposed to exclusively the legal) freedom a person has to perform an action which is 
valuable to them (Sen, 2009). This freedom is regulated by formal and informal 
institutions and social processes, which are poverty, education, employment, leisure 
time, legal rights, social status, and respect for bodily integrity (Drѐze and Sen, 2002; 
Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These form a holistic assessment of a 
person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003).  
Social power theory indicates that men enjoy more public power in the form 
of social sanction and access to material resources, while women are more susceptible 
to societal maltreatment (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Carli, 
1999). The inequity of resource acquisition creates a sense of dependency on the 
behalf of women on men (Butler, 1997). This dependency dispossesses women of 
independent agency, and lulls them into maintaining a subservient gendered status 
quo (Deveaux, 1994; Butler, 1997; Butler, 1999). As a result, women do not realize 
their full social and political potential as citizens.  
Outside of the public sphere, social and political behavior is often regulated 
within the home (Fuller and Fincham, 1995). This is salient within the family unit, 
where men traditionally have authority over their wives, and parents have authority 
over their children. To address this, this dissertation examines the effects of private 






 Intimate partner violence involves inflicting bodily injury on another within 
the context of marriage or a romantic relationship, and women are much more likely 
to experience intimate partner violence than are men (Bonomi et al., 2006). The 
experience of intimate partner violence creates helplessness, anxiety, social 
withdrawal, dependency on the dominant partner, and the inability to behave 
independently (Campbell, 2002; Zink, Regan, Jacobson, and Pabst, 2003). As this 
dynamic applies to political behavior, women who experience this have their 
capability space reduced, and retreat from the socio-political scene (Nussbaum, 2001; 
Khader, 2011).  
Though non-violent, emotional abuse can be even more damaging, and is far 
less likely to be unrecognized and unreported (Zink et al., 2003; Langhinrichsen-
Rohling, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). Emotionally abusive behavior is based on the 
abuser’s desire to control the victimized partner (Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; 
O’Leary, 1999). Victims typically believe that the abusive words are in fact true, and 
start to develop negative self-affect (Kaufmann, 2009; Rosenfeld, Lennon, and White, 
2005; O’Leary, 1999). This results in feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, 
depression, dependency, social withdrawal, and isolation (Kira, Omidy, Fawzi, Rice, 
Fawzi, Lewandowski, and Bujold-Bugeaud, 2015; Bevan and Higgins, 2002). The 
experience of emotional abuse reduces the capability space, as the abused also 
retreats from the public sphere; the likelihood of political participation is decreased 
(Khader, 2011).  
While control over another’s mobility is unaddressed by the legal system, this 





sphere, make independent decisions, and creates a dynamic of dependency on the 
controlling partner (Kira, et al., 2015; Khader, 2011). When one’s movements are 
controlled, he or she is unable to move between the private sphere and the public 
sphere freely. A natural consequence of this is that he or she is less likely to be able to 
engage in the public sphere independently. For women whose movements are being 
controlled, this creates a loss of the sense of self, making independent decision-
making difficult (Sackett and Saunders, 1999; Kabeer, 1999). In contrast, women 
who are able to move between the two spheres with more ease, typically due to 
employment, have a stronger sense of self and can make independent decisions easily 
(Kabeer, 1999).    
I assert that when an individual experiences violations of bodily integrity in 
the forms of i) domestic violence ii) familial control over mobility iii) emotional 
abuse iv) sexual harassment, his/her capability space decreases, thereby leading to 
voter demobilization. Conversely, I posit that when an individual has command over 
material resources, earns higher levels of income, and has experienced university-
level education, that his/her capability space increases, resulting in voter 
mobilization.   
Evidence of Violations of Personal Space Demobilizing Voters 
Featured in this dissertation is the analysis of voting behavior (largely but not 
exclusively among women) in four countries—the United States, Lebanon, Morocco, 
and Yemen. The most commonly associated demobilizing variable linked to the 
concept of personal space was familial control over mobility. This is statistically and 





In Yemen, where independent female mobility is legally restricted, this variable seem 
to propel women towards voting in heavily tribal areas. This is perhaps unsurprising, 
as tribal and familial control over mobility is a strong feature of Yemeni society, 
resulting in pressure to mobilize. Ultimately though, it appears as though the lack of 
independent mobility demobilizes women cross-regionally. Across all four samples, 
familial control over mobility is not a demobilizing factor among men, indicating that 
women are more likely to experience voter demobilization due to transgressions upon 
personal space than men are. Indeed, voter turnout was only equal in Lebanon—in the 
United States, Morocco, and Yemen, women were less likely to vote than men. 
 Though variables such as domestic violence, emotional abuse, and public 
sexual harassment appear to be significant in certain instances, these findings are not 
as generalizable as familial control over mobility. For example, the justification of 
domestic violence against one’s sex (used as a proxy for the experience of domestic 
violence) was significant only among American men. Similarly, only in Lebanon did 
variables pertaining either emotional abuse or public sexual harassment appear to be 
significant among women. Unique to Yemeni social dynamics, spousal control over 
the ability to seek health care demobilizes women.   
 Conversely, empowering factors such as university-level education, 
employment, and property ownership increase the propensity to vote. However, it 
appears as though university-level education empowers women more so than it does 
men, while employment empowers men more so than women.  
 In the context of female voting behavior, it appears as though psychological 





care), demobilizes voters more so than the experience of physical violence. This 
serves as a reminder of the power of non-physical abuse, and the socio-political 
consequences that occur. 
Case Selection: The United States, Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen 
For the purposes of examining the relationship between transgressions upon 
personal space and voter demobilization, this dissertation utilizes multiple case 
studies. The two primary cases are Lebanon and the United States, and there is a 
comparative chapter on Morocco and Yemen. At first glance, these appear to be odd 
cases for comparison. Interestingly though, the rate of both male-to-female domestic 
violence and public sexual harassment is similar in both Lebanon and the United 
States. Indeed, the rate of male-to-female domestic violence is 33% in the United 
States, while in Lebanon it is 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; National 
Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2014). In terms of public sexual harassment, 
the reported aggregate rate in the United States is 65%, while in Lebanon the rate is 
61% (IFES, 2010; Stop Street Harassment, 2014).    
While these commonalities between the United States and Lebanon exist, 
there is strong variation in i) institutional composition, ii) presence of ethno-political 
minorities, iii) gender-based socio-political spaces, and iv) degree of violent political 
conflict. This strong variation allows for an examination of the relationship between 
violations of personal space and voting within and across multiple socio-political 
systems. Including Morocco and Yemen as comparative case studies allows for even 





varying levels of ethno-political mobilization, political violence, and gender-based 
socio-political space.   
 In addressing the dimension of gender-based socio-political space, these four 
countries exist upon a continuum of legal protection and public social spaces made 
available for women. The United States is the most accommodating in that it provides 
both sexes with equal legal rights and has actively enforced laws regarding the 
protection of bodily integrity and gender-based domestic violence. Lebanon is the 
second in that there are higher levels of female employment, higher education, and 
public circulation, and domestic violence has recently been criminalized in 2014.  
Morocco is the third in that it undergoing democratization, has recently reformed its 
family status laws in 2004, and accords women more rights than it used to. Yemen 
the most restrictive in that the law does not allow a woman to leave the home without 
the permission of either her father or husband.  
 When discussing religion and ethno-political minorities, the United States has 
defined racial minorities with particular political bases; these are most typically those 
who are African-American/Black or Hispanic. Moreover, the dominant religion in the 
United States is Christianity, and this is featured in the dataset. In the Lebanese 
context, minority status is defined not by race, but by religion. Lebanon is home to 
Christians of Maronite, Greek Orthodox, and Catholic sects, as well as Muslims of 
Shi’ite, Sunni, and Druze origins. Unique to its own history, minority status in 
Morocco is based on neither race nor religion—it is based on linguistic use of the 
Berber language. Unlike any other country in this dissertation, Yemen’s social 





  Lastly, these four countries differ greatly in their governmental structures. 
The United States is a presidential system with a long history of regularly-occurring 
elections. Furthermore, the last civil war to occur on American soil was between 
1861-1865. This is in direct contradiction with the Lebanese and Yemeni cases, 
where violent political conflict has become systemic, and often leads to irregular 
scheduling of elections. Unlike any of the other cases, Morocco is transitioning from 
an absolute monarchy to that of a constitutional one, and while the kingdom has held 
parliamentary elections regularly since 1956, only recently has the power of the 
parliament increased. As such, the impact of voting on political outcomes has 
increased, and further empowers the citizen.  
Examining the same relationship across the strong variation present in and 
across systems of government and socio-political dynamics makes for a heightened 
understanding of voter demobilization due to transgressions upon personal space. 
This is the basis upon which I established my case selection.   
Models, Datasets, and Data Collection 
For the purposes of testing this theory, I used natural decomposition models 
across four sets of survey data, and conducted expert interviews. The datasets 
concerning Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen were gathered the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems during 2009-2010. The interviewers went door-to-
door, and conducted in-person interviews based on their survey instrument, titled the 





The dataset concerning the United States is original data, and I designed the 
survey instrument. I did so by adapting some of the critical questions from the Status 
of Women in the Middle East Datasets, and including questions which are grounded 
in American politics. The data was collected by Qualtrics, and the sampling selection 
was done though an online opt-in panel, with a specific 65% female quota, which 
over-sizes the female sample. Within the opt-in panel, Qualtrics randomizes the 
participants, and tries to structure the demographics such that they resemble those 
found in census data (Ashley McWhorter2, Written Communication with Author, 
August 11, 2015; Qualtrics, 2014). For the purposes of cost-effectiveness and ease of 
collecting data, this method was used. The median time to complete this survey was 
11:23 minutes. Approved on July 2nd, 3015 by the University of Maryland Internal 
Review Board, the full text of this questionnaire is featured in Appendix 5.A.  
Having explained the datasets, survey instruments, and data collection 
methods, it is appropriate to explain the utility of the models used. The use of the 
natural decomposition model is that it allows for the comparison of expected and real 
mean outcomes between groups in the context of logistic equations. Similar to 
standard logistic regression, the β-coefficients are interpreted in a logistic space, and 
then converted into log-odds ratios. The Ω-coefficient indicates the differences in 
predicted behaviors between the two models, and indicates statistical significance. I 
have substantiated each of these findings with a t-test. In the context of this research 
question, I am examining the expected and actual propensity of men and women to 
vote, and explaining the differences between the two.  
                                                 






The key independent variables which are representative of transgressions of 
personal space are: familial control over mobility, domestic violence, sexual 
harassment, and emotional abuse. Given the inchoate nature of the Lebanese, 
Moroccan, and Yemeni socio-political contexts, the ability to move in public without 
fear is also included for these three cases. This dissertation largely focuses on the 
effects of these transgressions on voting behavior among women, but men are also 
discussed. The dependent variable I have chosen to examine as the measure of 
political participation is a question asking whether or not the respondent voted. In the 
Lebanese dataset, this question refers to the last parliamentary elections. In the 
American dataset, this refers to the last presidential elections. In Morocco, this refers 
to national municipal elections, and in Yemen, the question addresses presidential 
elections. In all four countries, voting is not compulsory. 
Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space and Political Behavior in Lebanon: 
Results 
In examining the case of Lebanon, I found that not only is the relationship 
between transgressions upon personal space and voting behavior significant among 
women, but that there are religion-based variations as to the degree and type of 
transgression that they experience. Christian women are more likely to experience 
sexual harassment in the street, while Muslim women are more likely to experience 
reduced levels of independence within the home. The impact of restrictions of 
mobility on voting behavior appears to be stronger among women who are either in 





demobilizes men. Education and employment also enhance the female likelihood to 
vote, but this is not the case for men.  
Among both sexes, there are also religion-based variations in the propensity to 
vote, with Christians being the most likely to vote. Furthermore, following the news 
regularly, marriage, and the progression of age also increase the likelihood to vote 
among both men and women.  Along a similar vein, persons of Maronite Christian 
origin are more likely to vote than persons of any other sect. Perhaps predictably, men 
and women who are currently members of political parties are more likely to vote 
than either former members of political parties or persons who were never members 
of political parties. 
In the Lebanese context, it appears that female voting behavior is more 
sensitive to both demobilizing and mobilizing social mechanisms than that of men. 
Women experience demobilization when confronted with control over mobility and 
sexual harassment, while men do not. However, their propensity to vote increases in a 
stronger fashion compared to men when experiencing empowering processes, such as 
education and employment. The demobilizing effects of control over mobility are 
countered by the empowering mechanisms of education and employment, resulting in 
nearly equal turnout rates for men and women in the Lebanese context. 
Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and Political Participation in the United 
States: Results 
The results of examining gendered voting behavior in the United States 





among both sexes. For women, the factor is spousal control over mobility, and this is 
significant across all age groups. Among men, the demobilizing factor is the 
justification of female-to-male domestic violence, but this becomes significant only 
among men above the age of 30. Interestingly, this is also the median age for 
marriage among American men, indicating a relationship between the justification of 
female-to-male domestic violence and “locking-in” with one partner. The marital age 
trend is indicated in the sample, as the proportion of men aged from 18-29 whom are 
married is 28%, but jumps to 60% from age 30-39, and fluctuates only minimally as 
the age brackets increase. 
Among women, both education and income increase the propensity to vote, 
but neither displays significant empowering effects among men. This is similar to the 
Lebanese context, where education and employment empower increase the likelihood 
of female political participation, but the same is not true for men. Women are 
significantly less likely to vote if they have never been members of a political party.  
While reduced political participation among Republicans and Independents is also 
only salient among men, the decreased probability to vote if one has never been a 
member of a political party is also applicable to men. Lastly, having an existing 
interest in politics is a shared mobilizing factor among both sexes. 
Ultimately however, it appears as though men vote more than women do in 
the American context. While both sexes would be predicted to vote less given the 
resources that they have, it appears as though men utilize them more, thereby 





Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases of Morocco and Yemen: 
Results 
In an effort to compare the Lebanese and American results to other electorates 
with varying legal spaces that govern public and private personal spaces, I chose to 
write a comparative chapter on Morocco and Yemen. In both of these countries I 
found evidence of the demobilizing effect of violations of personal space upon 
voting, although they show in significantly different ways. 
In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house also experience 
voter demobilization, but education and employment do not empower women 
politically. This is likely because much of female labor in Morocco is through 
informal means, and often this labor is conducted at home, which reduces the 
mobilizing effect of employment. However, women who agree that it is acceptable 
for women to work outside of the home are more likely to vote than women who do 
not. Perhaps surprisingly, interest in politics does not impact the propensity to vote 
among men, but it does among women. 
Berber minority status, marriage, and age play a significant role in increasing 
the propensity to vote among both sexes. While the empowerment factors of age and 
marriage are salient across electorates, minority status is a surprise, and should be 
addressed in its context. In this particular election, a campaign was held to make 
Amazigh (language of the Berbers) an official language alongside Arabic, which 
mobilized the Berber community, which later materialized in the form of a 
referendum during the 2011 parliamentary elections (Ajbali, 2009; Tourabi, 2011). 





exceptionally politically motivated ethno-political group. Employment also increases 
the propensity to vote among men.  
Similar to the Moroccan context, Yemeni women are also more inclined to 
vote if they believe that it is socially acceptable for women to work outside of the 
home. Women are also more likely to vote if they are employed, have achieved 
university-level education, or watch the news regularly. Along a similar grain, they 
are more likely to vote if they feel free to express themselves. 
The demobilizing factors among Yemeni women are among the most 
interesting, and unique in comparison to the other cases. Unlike any other case, 
freedom to leave the house actually reduces a woman’s probability to vote in the 
Yemeni context. At first glance, this appears to be odd, but it can be explained by 
familial tribal links governing voting choice in Yemen.  Tribes hold most of the 
political power in the country, and tribal leaders secure votes from members of their 
same tribe by offering material goods or services. In this context, women are often 
pressured by family members to vote for a particular candidate; ~22% of Yemeni 
women indicated that they felt pressured by family members to vote, with the highest 
proportion coming from the Eastern tribal areas (IFES, 2010). Indeed, women are 2.3 
times more likely to vote if they indicate that they were pressured compared to 
women who indicated that they were not. 
The relationship between transgressions against bodily integrity in Yemen 
does not show in control over mobility, but rather in the form of the inability to make 





women can seek medical care independently, it appears as though spousal control 
over the ability to seek medical care reduces the probability to vote. 
Policy Implications for Women: Where to go from here? 
 
The policy implications for women in this context are three-step, as the 
policies necessary to reduce dominance in the home are often linked to increasing 
independent agency, which happens most often through establishing some command 
over social and material resources (Kosko, 2013; Khader, 2011; Anderson, 1997).  
The capability school of thought indicates that women who are educated and 
employed typically command material resources, expand their capability space, and 
by extension, are more likely to participate politically (Fuwa, 2004; Khader, 2011).  
However, other studies indicate that when women earn more than their spouses do, 
they are at increased risk for experiencing domestic violence (Andersen, 1997; Rocca, 
Rathod, Falle, Pande, and Krishnan, 2009). This being said, women who are educated 
and employed could be more likely to report abuse, rather than more likely to 
experience it. 
In the context of the capability framework, creating policies that would 
incentivize employers to hire women and raising the wages of typically feminine jobs 
would reduce resource inequality, and as a result, would reduce transgressions of 
personal space inside the home. Policy measures within legislative branches would be 
to diversify the political platforms where women are discussed, and in the Lebanese, 





Additional educational measures include university scholarships that target 
women, and creating more job opportunities whereby women can generate income. 
Ultimately, both education and employment increase a woman’s “capability space”, 
thereby increasing the chances of political participation. 
Unexplained and Outside of the Data 
At its foremost, this dissertation focuses on the relationship between 
violations of personal space and voter demobilization among women in a cross-
regional fashion, with an emphasis on voting behavior in the Arab world. Though it 
manifests itself differently, the relationship between transgressions of personal space 
and voter demobilization is consistent across all four electorates. While this is a new 
lens through which gender-based voting behavior is analyzed, there is still much 
concerning gender-based politics that this dissertation does not address. 
  Firstly, the only form of political participation that is measured is that of the 
vote. While this is the most widespread form of citizen-based political participation, 
other forms of political participation have not been addressed. These include political 
protest, writing or signing petitions that advocate for reform, creating political 
literature (often in the form of online posting), and the like. These forms of political 
participation are activist behaviors (rather than widespread citizen behaviors), and 
thus, do not work as baseline measures of political activity where non-participation 
can be interpreted as demobilization. 
 Secondly, this dissertation examines voting across four very different 





being captured across the spectrum, and ii) whether or not voting is a baseline 
political activity for public political participation in all four contexts.    
 In the context of autocratic and democratic governance, voting may have 
different implications. This is even more true when ethnopolitical cleavages dominate 
the political landscape, as members of the electorate use ethnic affiliations as 
heuristic cues when determining whom to vote for (Birnir, 2007). Moreover, ethnic 
affiliations are typically associated with informal pork distribution, and these are 
salient in the Lebanese and Yemeni cases (Corstange, 2008). The promise of 
receiving direct material benefit in the form of food, money, or services presents 
different incentives for voting than those whose political interactions are framed 
within programmatic distribution systems. Moreover, where voters use ethno-political 
cues in deciding whom to vote for these mechanisms are thought to create familial-
based incentives to vote rather than individual ones, thereby reducing the likelihood 
that voting is a measure of the individual choice to participate politically (Norris and 
Mattes, 2003; Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, and Brusco, 2013).  
Additionally, these countries different significantly in the degree of 
democratic governance under which their electorates operate. Though voting is 
considered to be a democratic enterprise, voting also occurs in autocratic settings 
(Magaloni, 2008). In this context, autocracies will co-opt opposition parties into the 
government in order to reduce popular opposition to their rule (Josua, 2011). This is 
salient in the Moroccan and Yemeni cases, where their respective opposition parties 





support (Hamzawy, 2008; Binoual, 2011; Clark, 2004). Though this represents a 
degree of political freedom, political rights are not entirely secured under the law.   
 Using voting as a baseline activity for political participation across all four 
significantly varying political climates also warrants clarification. In all four 
countries, voting is the most widespread reported form of political participation; 
79.5% of the Lebanese sample indicated that they voted, while 78% of the American 
sample indicated the sample. In the Moroccan and Yemeni cases, 47% of the 
Moroccan sample indicated that they voted, as did 62% of the American sample 
(IFES, 2010). Voting appears to be the most widespread modicum of political 
participation in all cases, thereby making them appropriate for comparison. 
Along a continued characterization of voting behavior, this dissertation does 
not address non-voting as an act of political participation in the form of boycott. 
Though non-voting can sometimes be explained in this context, it is used to measure 
demobilization in this dissertation. 
In addition, the only socio-political cleavage that is examined is that of the 
citizen, and not the politician. This dissertation does not address the propensity for 
women to develop a political base as potential politicians, gender-based difficulties 
that exist when developing a campaign, or the propensity for voters to elect female 
candidates. This dissertation also does not include recommendations which would 
allow for increased female participation in governmental positions. 
Lastly, this dissertation does not provide an in-depth analysis as to the 





among men as a separate socio-political entity. This is particularly relevant to the 
American context, where results indicate that endorsing domestic violence among 
one’s own sex reduces political mobilization only among men. 
Directions for Future Research 
Having established that this dissertation leaves some dynamics of political 
participation unexplained, there are many directions for future research. The first 
would be to conduct an in-depth analysis as to dynamics of violations of bodily 
integrity and political participation among men in particular. This dissertation largely 
focuses on women, and another study that examines men through this lens would 
prove to be very insightful. 
Along a similar vein, in the Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen datasets, the 
questions used to measure marital dynamics were asked only of women. This is 
limiting, as it does not allow the researcher to examine marital decision-making 
mechanisms as they relate to voting behavior among married men. Creating and 
executing a poll which incorporates these questions among both sexes, comparing the 
results to those found in the United States dataset, and discovering cross-cultural 
similarities (or culture-based differences) would be a strong contribution to electoral 
studies. 
While this study indicates that violations upon personal space cause voter 
demobilization, other forms of political participation (in the form of protest, 
nomination for political candidacy, etc.) should be addressed. This would provide a 





space cause political demobilization only among voters, or if this relationship can 
also be observed in other forms of political participation.    
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized across six chapters. Titled Incursions on 
Personal Space and Political Participation, this introduction provides an overview as 
to the findings and implications of the dissertation. The second chapter, Bodily 
Transgressions and Political Participation in Comparative Politics, explains the 
conceptual framework within which this dissertation is created.  
Using analyses performed on the Status of Women in the Middle East and 
North Africa: Case of Lebanon3 along with elite interviews which I conducted, the 
third chapter, Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political Behavior in 
Lebanon, addresses the relationship between voter demobilization and transgressions 
upon personal space. In particular, this chapter explores voter demobilization due to 
familial control over mobility, verbal/emotional abuse, domestic violence, and public 
sexual harassment. This chapter also illustrates how there is that there is ethno-
political variation as to the degree to which women experience either transgression of 
personal space; Muslim women are more likely to experience familial control over 
mobility, while Christian women are more likely to experience public sexual 
harassment.  
 The fourth chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Political Participation in the United States, explores the relationship between voter 
demobilization and transgressions upon personal space across the same axes. Having 
                                                 





created my questionnaire4 across 1,268 adults and conducted elite interviews, I found 
that control over mobility causes voter demobilization among women, while the 
justification of domestic violence against one’s own sex causes voter demobilization 
among men. 
 In the fifth chapter Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The 
Cases of Morocco and Yemen, I use the Status of Women in the Middle East and 
North Africa: The Case of Morocco and the Status of Women in the Middle East and 
North Africa: The Case of Yemen datasets5 to provide insight as to how voter 
demobilization due to incursions upon personal space works. I found that in Morocco, 
familial control over mobility causes voter demobilization among women, while in 
Yemen, spousal control over the ability to seek health care demobilizes women. 
These two different measures of transgressions against personal space highlight how 
voter demobilization due to incursions upon personal space manifests itself 
differently across multiple political systems.  
 This dissertation concludes with the sixth chapter, Mobilizing Bodies: 
Protecting Women and Democracy. This chapter provides policy recommendations 
that would increase the likelihood of female political participation, and explains that 
implications that such an increase could create.  
 
                                                 
4 This research was funded by the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, the Department of 
Government and Politics Women’s Group, a writing fellowship awarded by the graduate school, and 
the 2015 BSOS Dean’s Research Initiative.  






In this chapter, Incursions on Personal Space and Political Participation, I 
argue that transgressions of personal space serve as a demobilizing force upon voters. 
Citizens are particularly less likely to vote when their mobility is controlled. In 
contrast, persons are more likely to vote when they experience higher levels of 
education, employment, and bodily independence.  I also indicate what the 
dissertation does not explain, and provide an explanation of the dissertation chapters.   
 In the next chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in 
Comparative Politics, I provide the in-depth conceptual framework concerning 
transgressions upon personal space, demobilization, and the resulting withdrawal 
from political life. I explain this relationship with foundations in the relationship 
between power, the body, society, and the extension of these dynamics over socio-
political cleavages related to gender, minority status, socio-economic status, and age. 
Furthermore, I explain my particular focus on the United States and Lebanon, and 
describe their governmental systems and feminist histories. Lastly, I explain the 













Chapter 2: Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in 
Comparative Politics 
 
In the previous chapter, Incursions on Personal Space and Political 
Participation, I argue that transgressions of personal space serve as a demobilizing 
force upon voters. Citizens are less likely to vote when exposed to harassment in 
public, when their mobility is controlled, and have lower levels of education and 
employment. In contrast, persons are more likely to vote when they experience higher 
levels of education, employment, and bodily independence.  I also offer an 
explanation and outline of the dissertation chapters, and indicate that the United 
States and Lebanon are case studies in this dissertation.   
 In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in 
Comparative Politics, I indicate the in-depth conceptual framework concerning 
transgressions upon personal space, demobilization, and the resulting withdrawal 
from political life. I explain this relationship with foundations in the relationship 
between power, the body, society, and the extension of these dynamics over socio-
political cleavages related to gender, minority status, socio-economic status, and age. 
Moreover, I present a justification for using the United States and Lebanon as case-
studies, with explanations as to their systems of government and the arc of feminism 






Introducing the Body to Voting Behavior 
The study of voting behavior is hardly new to the discipline of political 
science. The right to vote is one of the foundations of citizenship in democratic states, 
and is the most common form of citizen political participation. While this is a right 
granted to all citizens in democratic states, studies show that citizen-rights often 
require resources if they are to be exercised (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995). 
Indeed, social empowerment mechanisms such as income, employment, and 
education increase political knowledge and efficacy, which in turn heighten the 
propensity to vote (Brady, Verba, and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Burns, Scholzman, 
1997; Bartels, 2008).  
 All of this being said, citizens do not enjoy such benefits equally, nor is the 
propensity to vote similar across socio-political cleavages. Those with reduced access 
to primary goods such as income, education, and employment are less likely to 
participate in public life (Brighouse and Robeyns, 2010; Unterhalter and Brighouse, 
2014).  As this extends to voting behavior, citizens with low income, low levels of 
education, women, racial minorities and some occupational groups tend to participate 
less in elections and know less about politics than other citizens (Bartels, 2008; 
Claibourn and Sapiro, 2000; Suzuki and Chappell, 1996). Not only do such groups 
participate less, but their impact on governance when they do vote is also less. It 
appears as though the impact of poorer voters on governance is negligible; their 
voices do not tend to be heard, and their needs are rarely taken into consideration 





Group inequalities in achieved functions are often reflective of inequalities in 
capabilities (Sen, 2001; Robeyns, 2003; Anderson, 1999). Given that there are group 
inequalities in the distribution of socio-political resources such as education and 
income, it follows that those who have such resources are able to do more than those 
who do not.  Ultimately, this creates a dynamic where subsets of citizens are not 
engaging politically not because they do not want to, but because they are unable to 
(Nussbaum, 2005; Hesford and Kozol, 2005; Robeyns, 2003). As this dynamic 
applies to gender politics, men are more likely to vote, display political knowledge, 
and political efficacy than are women all over the world (Inglehart and Norris, 2003; 
Verba, Burns, Scholzman, 1997). This is often linked to resource-based 
characteristics, such as the increased likelihood of men to hold higher-paying jobs, 
secure higher education, and increased accessibility to resources that enable building 
civic-skills (Agarwal, 1997; Nussbaum, 2005). These resource-based factors are 
undoubtedly important in explaining political behavior. However, what is often 
ignored in this assessment is that personal capabilities related to voting behavior are 
inclusive of many factors outside of measurable resources. 
Coined by Amartya Sen and grounded in the concepts of social justice and 
human development, the capability approach to addressing socio-political inequity is 
principally concerned with what people are able to do and be (Sen, 2001; Nussbaum, 
2003). Essentially, capability is formed of two dimensions—the effective freedom to 
perform an action, and the desire to do so (Alkire, 2002; Sen, 2009). Effective 
freedom is defined as the actual (as opposed to merely on paper) freedom a person 





regulated by formal and informal institutions and social processes (Drѐze and Sen, 
2002). According to the capability framework, these dimensions are: poverty, 
education, employment, leisure time, legal rights, social status, and respect for bodily 
integrity (Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These form a holistic 
assessment of a person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003). While political 
scientists have paid much attention to elements of the capability space such as 
education, income, and social status as they related to the increased likelihood of 
persons to vote, little has been done to directly address the dimension of bodily 
integrity as it relates to voting behavior. 
Thus far, the relationship between violence and political participation has 
been studied in the context of war or the experience of crime. In a study consisting of 
natural experiment examining the political behavior of ex-combatants in Northern 
Uganda, it appears as though those who were forcibly recruited into participating into 
the Lord’s Resistance Army were 27% more likely to vote than those who were not 
(Blattman, 2009). Yet another study indicates that experiencing crime victimization 
leads to increased rates of political participation, leading one to think that such an 
experience may turn a citizen into an activist (Bateson, 2012; Bellows and Miguel, 
2006). This goes against the train of thought that those who experience political 
violence become alienated from the socio-political sphere; rather, an opposite trend is 
salient (Blattman, 2009; Baines, 2005). 
However, these studies examines the effects of political violence and crime on 
voting behavior, not control over personal space in the context of one’s home. 





different types of exposures to repressive mechanisms, and as this dissertation 
indicates, yield very different results. 
The Body, Repression, and Reduced Political Participation 
The body is the center of individual operations of power, it is also the object 
of political control in the public domain (Beasley and Bacchi, 2000; Lister, 1997a). 
Power is inscribed on the body not only by the individual, but also by society (Butler, 
1999; Deveaux, 1994; Foucault, 1978). The sexualization of the body often leads to 
its repression in the form of shame, insult, neglect, or the negation of its existence by 
social forces (Foucault, 1978; Butler, 1997).  These are transgressions upon bodily 
integrity. 
The concept of bodily integrity emphasizes the inviolability over the body, 
and one’s autonomy over it (Patosalmi, 2009; Nussbaum, 2003). Incursions upon 
one’s bodily integrity (popular examples are receiving obscene gestures or touching 
that is inappropriately intimate) are violations of desired privacy, and as such, are met 
with annoyance, fear, anxiety, and other negative emotions (Barling, Rogers, and 
Kelloway, 2001). Chronic exposure to sexual harassment creates psychological 
distress and leads to social withdrawal (Richman et. al., 1999; Fitzgerald et. al., 
1997). Indeed, sexual harassment also functions as a form of discrimination, and 
makes it more difficult for women to be taken seriously (Gruber, 1998). This reduces 






Heavily linked to the concept of bodily integrity is that of personal space. 
Personal space is the “invisible, variable volume of space surrounding an individual 
which defines that individual’s preferred distance from others” (Burgoon, 1978). This 
space serves as a protective space between one’s self and others (Lane, 1990; Barron, 
1990; Leino-Kilpia et. al, 2001). This space is based on both biological and 
psychological needs (Burgoon, 1982). The propensity to experience violations of 
bodily integrity and/or personal space is regulated by institutional and social forces. 
Without control over one’s body, access to the public sphere is impaired (Beasley and 
Bacchi, 2000; O’Connor et al., 1999; Lister 1997a). Ultimately, those who do not 
have autonomous control over their bodies often experience attitudinal adaptive 
preference, whereby the person acquiesces their lack of autonomy, and then refrains 
from engage in the public sphere (Deveaux, 1994; Nussbaum, 2005; Sen, 2001; 
Khader, 2011). Outside of control exercised by the individual, the body is controlled 
by institutions and social forces. 
Institutional Regulation of Bodily Capabilities 
 
Respect for bodily integrity is intimately linked to the power of institutions 
(Foucault, 1977).  Institutions normalize behavioral rules, create and enforce laws, 
and create a power structure where citizens are subject to the rules upheld by the 
institutions (Butler, 1997). Using the example of the Great Confinement, Michel 
Foucault explains institutional power over the body by discussing that the measures 
originally taken to curb the plague. These included quarantine, social segregation, 
marked doors to indicate individual exclusion, and other forms of statist disciplinary 





the individual (Foucault, 1977). Those who were deemed undesirable, such as the 
unemployed, beggars, lepers, and the mentally challenged were sent to Houses of 
Correction by force, independently of having the plague (Foucault, 1977). The rules 
under which one could exist without government interference, the amount of personal 
agency one had, and the independent authority an individual had over their physical 
body changed due to policy. Political change in the public sphere led to changes in 
the private realm of personal space and personal agency. 
While the world has changed a great deal since the Great Confinement, the 
power that institutions have over the body remains. In modern times, institutional 
regulations (originating from both religious and secular social bodies) that concern 
the body include those concerning birth, death, health, marriage rights, sex, and 
physical security (Turner, 2008). However, the legal regulation of bodily capabilities 
and the social forces that surround them are not always similar. 
Social Regulation of Bodily Capabilities 
The body exists within a constructed cultural system, and people often 
regulate their behavior in response to social norms and cues (Turner, 2008; Faubion, 
2000). In religious institutions, this includes moralization of the body in the form of 
abstinence until marriage, dietary rules, and clothing that is meant to ensure modesty 
(Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Connell, 2014). Broader social norms dictate the definition of 
masculine or feminine traits, appropriate gender roles, proper sexual behavior, and 
sex-based division of labor (Butler, 1997; Fausto-Sterling, 2000; Risman, 2004; 





Social power theory explains that society confers greater power on men in the 
form of social attitudes and access to resources, while women are left more 
vulnerable to social harm (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Carli, 
1999).The increased resources afforded to men create women as subjects within this 
power-structure and the inequity of resource acquisition creates the dependency of 
women on men (Butler, 1997). This sense of subordination deprives women of 
independent agency, and lulls them into maintaining a subservient gendered status 
quo (Deveaux, 1994; Butler, 1997; Butler, 1999). As a result, women do not realize 
their full social and political potential as citizens.  
At a more intimate level, social and political behavior is often regulated by 
dynamics within the family and inter-personal relationships (Morris, Silk, Steinberg, 
Myers, and Robinson, 2007; Fuller and Fincham, 1995). This is salient in marriage 
and family relationships, where men traditionally have authority over their wives, and 
parents have authority over their children. Still, despite the evidence that bodily 
regulation affects political and social life of women, few quantitative studies have 
measured the impact of both institutional and social regulations of the body in the 
political sphere, particularly in the case of women. To address this, this dissertation 
examines the effects of private regulations including intimate partner violence, 
emotional abuse, and control over mobility and public regulations such as sexual 
harassment on the voting behavior of women. 
Whose Bodies? Women, Minority Status, Youth, and Demobilization 
The first type of regulation examined is intimate partner violence. Intimate 





marriage or a romantic relationship, and women are much more likely to experience 
intimate partner violence than are men (Bonomi et al., 2006). Exposure to intimate 
partner violence creates feelings of helplessness, anxiety, social withdrawal, 
dependency on the dominant partner, and overall reduced ability to behave 
independently (Campbell, 2002; Zink, Regan, Jacobson, and Pabst, 2003). As this 
dynamic applies to political behavior, women who experience this have their 
capability space reduced, and retreat from the socio-political scene (Nussbaum, 2001; 
Khader, 2011). While intimate partner violence is criminalized in many countries, 
including Lebanon and the United States, it often goes unreported, and is a persistent 
problem in present day. Owing to the fact that domestic violence was only 
criminalized in 2014, there are no official statistics on domestic violence in Lebanon, 
but multiple studies place the number at 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; 
United Nations Development Programme, 2009). The rate of domestic violence in the 
United States among women is 1 in 3, or 33% (National Coalition Against Domestic 
Violence, 2014).   
The second type of private regulation is emotional abuse. Largely grounded in 
a locus of the desire to control the victimized partner, studies indicate that the effects 
of emotional abuse are even more acute than those of physical abuse 
(Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). The reason for this is that victims 
internalize the abuse that they receive, believe that the abusive words are in fact true, 
and start to develop negative self-affect (Kaufmann, 2009; Rosenfeld, Lennon, and 
White, 2005; O’Leary, 1999). This results in feelings of worthlessness, helplessness, 





Fawzi, Lewandowski, and Bujold-Bugeaud, 2015; Bevan and Higgins, 2002). When 
this occurs, the capability space of the abused is reduced, and the abused also retreats 
from the public sphere, making engagement in public activities difficult. As a 
consequence, the likelihood of political participation is decreased (Khader, 2011). 
Further, while emotional abuse is also incorporated into laws pertaining to domestic 
abuse, it often goes unrecognized by the abused (who after chronic exposure, 
normalizes the behavior and believes his/her abuser is just “being honest”) and thus, 
unreported (Zink et al., 2003).  
  Third, controlled mobility is another regulation that contributes to a reduction 
social and political activities. While there are no laws that prevent control over 
another’s mobility, this power structure reduces the likelihood of the controlled to 
interact with the public sphere, make independent decisions, and fosters dependency 
on the controlling partner (Kira, et al., 2015; Khader, 2011). When one’s movements 
are controlled, he or she is unable to move between the private sphere and the public 
sphere freely, and are less likely to be able to engage in the public sphere 
independently. For women whose movements are being controlled, this creates a loss 
of the sense of self, making independent decision-making difficult (Sackett and 
Saunders, 1999; Kabeer, 1999). In contrast, women who are able to move between 
the two spheres with more ease, typically due to employment, have a stronger sense 
of self and can make independent decisions easily (Kabeer, 1999).   
 In all, women who experience relationship dynamics that can be 
characterized by these three categories of private body regulation examined, are often 





Andersen, 1997; Gelles, 1993, Smith, 1990). Indeed, women who choose to be in 
committed partner relationships at an early age tend to be less educated and are 
poorer, leaving them with fewer resources upon which they can rely for the purposes 
of social independence (Blau, Kahn, and Waldfogel, 2000; Andersen, 1997). 
Indicated in this study, the reduced independent agency that ensues also depresses the 
likelihood of political participation. 
Publically and cross-regionally (Kira et al., 2015; Enns, 2004; Jaggar and 
Rothenger, 1993), women also face gender discrimination in the form of sexual 
harassment, and women are more vulnerable to this than are men (Fisk and Berdahl, 
2007; Nussbaum, 2000; Agarwal, 1994). Sexual harassment also has ethno-political 
roots, as persons of minority targets are often at heightened risk (Cho, 1997; Berdahl 
and Moore, 2006). While younger women are thought to be more likely to be sexually 
harassed, studies indicate that harassment of women in older age cohorts (50 and 
above) is still prevalent, but less frequently reported (Cortina and Wasti, 2005; Pain, 
1995; Ford and Donis, 1996). Ultimately, sexual harassment is geared towards those 
with perceived low social power (Cortina and Wasti, 2005). 
Public sexual harassment is interesting in that although it occurs in the public 
sphere, there are no laws that protect individuals in public from cat-calling, groping, 
or other forms of sexual harassment. While there are laws that implemented 
pertaining to sexual harassment at work, the penalty for this is often sanctioned by the 
work institution, and not by the state. This means that those who are victimized on the 
street go unprotected.  As these dynamics apply to the case studies featured in this 





whereas 65% of American women did in private studies (IFES, 2010; Stop Street 
Harassment, 2014). In both countries, ethnopolitical dynamics are featured in the 
frequency of sexual harassment. Women of African-American or Hispanic origins are 
much more likely to experience sexual harassment in the United States than women 
of any other ethnic group, whereas Christian women in Lebanon are more likely to be 
sexually harassed than their Muslim counterparts (Berdahl and Moore, 2006; IFES, 
2010). 
The Mobilized Body 
In contrast to the demobilizing effects of intimate partner violence, emotional 
abuse, mobility control, and sexual harassment, many factors can work to 
counterbalance these effects and increase political and social mobilization among 
women. For instance, education and employment are the two strongest predictors of 
social empowerment, particularly among women (Kabeer, 2005; Fuwa, 2004; 
Charmes and Wieringa, 2003; Kabeer, 1999). The two allow for the ability to enjoy 
increased personal agency, the ability to enjoy independent choice, the ability to 
secure resources, and the ability participate in public social networks (Kabeer, 2005, 
Kabeer, 1999). The ability to secure income also enables women more decision-
making power within the home, and equalizes power dynamics between spouses 
(Fuwa, 2004; Khader, 2011).  
 These empowerment mechanisms extend into voting behavior. In the context 
of gender politics, studies suggest that female participation in the paid labor force has 
a significant impact on their propensity to participate politically (Inglehart and Norris, 





fewer women than men who are employed, and women who are in the workforce tend 
to hold lower-paying jobs (Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Mammen and Paxson, 2000; 
Manza and Brooks, 1998; Verba, Burns, and Schlozman, 1997). As a result, women 
are less able to organize politically, and their voices and needs are not given their full 
due (Ingelhart and Norris, 2003b).  
Female disenfranchisement is a problem worldwide (Ingelhart and Norris, 
2003a). When the rates of female employment are low, women are less likely to 
mobilize politically, to lobby for expanded rights, and less likely to gain 
representation in government (Ross, 2008; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Verba, Burns, 
and Schlozman, 1997). In contrast, generating independent income enables women to 
participate politically, delay childbirth, have fewer children, and invest in the health 
and education of their own children (Telhami, 2013; Schlozman, Burns, and Verba, 
1999; Moghadam, 1999). It is clear here that the empowerment mechanisms behind 
employment drive persons to expand their capabilities, and engage in the public 
sphere. 
Similarly, education is among the strongest predictors of voter turnout 
(Hillygus, 2005; Shields and Goidel, 1997; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, 1995).  
Indeed, education increases political participation, electoral turnout, civic 
engagement, political knowledge, and democratic attitudes and opinions (Hillygus, 
2005; Galston, 2001).  Education exposes people to political issues, allows them to 
participate in social networks, and in turn, allows for the development of civic 
consciousness (Galston, 2001; Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Barry; 1996). While this is true 





does men, as empowerment mechanisms are felt more strongly in groups that are 
disenfranchised (Kabeer, 1999; Abdo, forthcoming).  
Education and employment are both linked to the reduced frequency of 
incursions upon bodily integrity. Indeed, women who are highly educated and who 
are employed are less likely to experience transgressions of personal space, both in 
public and particularly in their homes (Khader, 201l; Nussbaum, 2005; Cortina and 
Wasti, 2005; Sen, 2001). Education and employment create the space to generate 
income, increase access to social resources, and provided higher levels of social 
status. These mechanisms combined create greater levels of autonomy, allowing 
women to make independent decisions, including those over their bodies. These skills 
enable them to make political choices, and increase the likelihood of voting.   
Demobilized Bodies Within and Across Democratic Electorates 
Having explained the conceptual framework within which this dissertation is 
grounded, the unique case-study selection merits further explanation. Most studies 
concerning gender and capabilities in specific countries in the developing world, such 
as India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Honduras, on the basis that gendered norms are 
stronger, and gender-based impairment is more acute (Drѐze and Sen, 2002; 
Nussbaum, 2001; Rowlands, 1997). However, very little work has been done on this 
topic in either the Arab world or Western countries. Failing to incorporate Western 
countries implies that women do not experience socio-political difficulties due to 
gender-based reductions in their capabilities. Neglecting to incorporate women in the 
Arab world does not do credence to their socio-political presence in non-Western 





violations of bodily integrity and personal space are so integral to individual 
capabilities that their impact is felt on voting behavior in spite of starkly different 
cultures, governmental systems, and regions.   
At first glance, the United States and Lebanon seem like an odd pairing. 
However, Lebanon is among the very few countries in the Middle East with 
democratic features, making it appropriate for the investigation of voting behavior in 
the region. The United States, as a Western country, is widely considered to be 
developed, but there remains ample room to study affects of abuse and mobility on 
voting behavior as domestic violence rates are still comparable to less developed 
nations. Combined, these two fill the niche of examining questions of bodily 
integrity, capabilities, and voting behavior in the Arab world and the Western world. 
 These two countries have drastic differences and similarities. Lebanon has 
endured years of endemic violent political conflict on its own soil, while the United 
States has not. Lebanon also has gender-based laws in both its civil and religious 
courts, while the United States has a legally egalitarian system which is entirely 
incorporated under its civil courts. However, in spite of these heavy differences, the 
reported levels of violations of bodily integrity are similar. As indicated earlier, in the 
United States, the reported level of domestic abuse is 33%, while in Lebanon it is 
35% (National Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2014; Usta, Farver, and 
Pashayan, 2007). The reported level of sexual harassment on the streets in the U.S. is 
at 65%, while in Lebanon the level is 61% (Stop Street Harassment, 2014; IFES, 





Similar to the cross-national validity of empowering mechanisms of education 
and employment in the analysis of voting behavior, the aforementioned socio-
structural similarities lead me to believe that the relationship between bodily integrity 
and voting behavior is valid cross-regionally and across democratic political systems. 
Moreover, the relationship between bodily integrity as an element of capability space 
and voting behavior is unexplored thus far, and I believe that doing so would shed 
new light on mechanisms that relate to female behavior in democratic systems. 
The United States 
The United States government is both presidential and federal, consisting of 
fifty states. The federal government is composed of three distinct institutions: 
Congress, which is the legislative branch, the Office of the President and the Cabinet, 
which is the executive branch, and the Supreme Court as the judicial branch. Citizens 
directly vote for their representative in Congress and for the office of the President. 
The Congress is a bicameral legislative institution, consisting of The House of 
Representatives and the Senate. The House of Representatives currently consists of 
435 voting members, and has six non-voting members.  The number of 
representatives each state has in the House is based on each state's population as 
determined in the most recent United States Census. All 435 representatives serve a 
two-year term. The Senate is made up of two senators from each state, regardless of 
population. There are 100 senators, who each serve six-year terms. Approximately 
one-third of the Senate stands for election every two years. The last Congressional 





 In the United States, the president is indirectly elected through the Electoral 
College. Citizens who wish to vote cast ballots to indicate their choice to the 
members of the Electoral College of their state, who in turn cast their votes in a 
fashion that is representative of those in their state. These elections happen every four 
years, and the president is allowed two consecutive terms. The last presidential 
elections occurred in 2012. 
Lebanon 
The Lebanese political system is that of a unitary consociational democracy, 
whereby the governmental system is structured such that different politically 
significant sects share in power-holding. There are six politically significant sects that 
have developed political constituencies: Sunni Muslim, Shi’ite Muslim, Druze 
Muslim, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox Christian, and Catholic Christian.  The 
uni-cameral parliament consists of 128 seats, and the consociational allocation of 
these seats is done according to a 6:6 ratio of Muslims to Christians (the Muslim side 
accommodates 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi’ites, and 1 Druze, while Christian side holds 2 
Maronites, 2 Orthodox, and 1 Catholic).  Parliamentarians are elected by adults aged 
21 and over. There are multiple political parties in Lebanon, and these organizations 
are personalistic in nature. Political blocs are usually based on religious or filial 
allegiance. The last parliamentary elections were conducted in 2009.  
As illustrated above, both of these countries have very visible mechanisms 
that affect voting behavior. Moreover, feminism emerged at the same time (during the 





product of increasing feminine presence in the workforce (Keller, 1995). In Lebanon, 
feminism emerged as a result of the pervasive presence of communism in the 1970s, 
where leftist movements rejected traditional religious laws in the legal system in 
favor of secular ones which afforded women greater equality (Joseph, 2002). As 
indicated earlier, both countries have similar reported levels of sexual harassment and 
domestic violence are similar, making for feasible comparisons as to the mechanisms 
of transgressions upon bodily integrity and their relationship to voting behavior.  
Methodology 
In order to execute this study, I rely largely on survey data, and also conduct 
my own elite interviews with organizations that specialize in women’s causes. For the 
purposes of the United States, I created my own poll, and conducted an online survey 
in the United States during August 2015 using Qualtrics. The survey that I conducted 
was through an opt-in panel of 1,268 persons with a 65% female quota, leading to a 
gender breakdown of 834 women and 434 men. The time needed for completing of 
the survey instrument averaged at 11:23 minutes. The complete survey is featured in 
Appendix 5.A. 
The data that I have on Lebanon was gathered by the International Foundation 
for Electoral Studies on the Status of Women in the Middle East and North Africa. 
The data gathered by IFES was gathered by way of door-to-door 47-minute oral 
interviews in Arabic, with only one adult member of each household being 
interviewed. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents were from urban areas and 23 
percent from rural areas, and data was gathered through multi-stage cluster sampling.  





households were selected from each cluster.  For the purposes of randomization, 
respondents within the home were selected using the Kish grid method, where adult 
respondents within a household are placed on a grid, and one person is randomly 
selected based on a pre-existing algorithm. There were 2000 women, and 750 men 
(IFES, 2010).  
 The data on Morocco and Yemen was also gathered by the International 
Foundation for Electoral Systems. In both cases, the sample size was such that there 
are 2000 women and 500 men, and the sampling strategy was multi-stage, stratified, 
probability proportional to size (PPS). In Morocco, this was executed across all 16 
governorates (LMS-CSA, 2009; Rola Abdul-Latif, phone communication with 
author, April 18, 2014). There were 255 primary sampling points, with 8-12 
interviews per sampling point (LMS-CSA, 2009; R. Abdul-Latif, Oral 
Communication April 18, 2014). The households were selected in a (1+ skip 
number), or rather, every other house (LMS-CSA, 2009). In Yemen, the survey was 
set up such that there were 250 primary sampling points, with each sampling point 
consisting of 80-120 households (Yemen Polling Center, 2010). At each sampling 
point, houses were selected in a (6+1) fashion, or rather, every seventh house. 10-12 
interviews were conducted per sampling point, and selection of the interviewee within 









In this chapter, I explained the relationship between power, society, and the 
body. I also indicated how this relationship extends into gender, ethno-political 
cleavages, age brackets, and socio-economic status. I also detail how this leads to 
physical demobilization, the reduction in personal capabilities, and ultimately, the 
reduced likelihood of voting.  
 In the next chapter, Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and Political 
Behavior in Lebanon, I provide sophisticated quantitative analysis as to the three 
dominant trends in transgressions of personal space that demobilize voters in the 
Lebanese sample: i) public sexual harassment ii) spousal emotional abuse and iii) 
familial control over mobility. I also argue that there are religion-based trends in the 
type of incursions upon bodily integrity that are present. Specifically, Christian 
women experience more street harassment, while Muslim women are more likely to 
have their mobility controlled inside the home. There are also religious trends in 
voting behavior—Muslims are less likely to vote than their Christian counterparts. 
Through the use of interviews, I present the gender-based power-dynamics present 
within legal and political institutions in Lebanon, and indicate the challenges that 







Chapter 3: Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and 
Political Behavior in Lebanon 
 
 In Chapter II, Bodily Transgressions and Political Participation in 
Comparative Politics, I provide conceptual explanations as to how political 
demobilization occurs as a result of transgressions of personal space in both public 
and private spheres. In this chapter, Religion, Transgressions of Personal Space, and 
Political Behavior in Lebanon, I will address how different types of transgressions of 
personal space affect political behavior across multiple ethno-political groups. The 
results indicate that freedom to leave the home, freedom from sexual harassment, 
freedom from spousal emotional abuse, university education, employment, and 
regular exposure to political media increase the likelihood to vote. In this dataset, 
39% of Lebanese women state that they do not feel completely free to leave the home 
without the permission of their parents/spouses. Of women who report these 
restrictions, 37% did not show up to the polls, compared to 22% among those who 
felt completely free. 
The results also indicate that Christian women are more likely to be sexually 
harassed publicly, while Muslim women are more likely to have their movements 
controlled within the home. In this dataset, only female political participation is 
affected by transgressions on personal space. Moreover, freedom to leave the house 
impacts voting behavior among women most acutely among women below their mid-






Religion, Government Institutions, and Voting Behavior 
The Lebanese political system is a unitary consociational democracy. There 
are six politically significant sects that have developed political constituencies: Sunni 
Muslim, Shi’ite Muslim, Druze Muslim, Maronite Christian, Greek Orthodox 
Christian, and Catholic Christian.  The uni-cameral parliament consists of 128 seats, 
and the consociational allocation of these seats is done according to a 6:6 ratio of 
Muslims to Christians (the Muslim side accommodates 2 Sunnis, 2 Shi’ites, and 1 
Druze, while Christian side holds 2 Maronites, 2 Orthodox, and 1 Catholic).  
Parliamentarians are elected by adults aged 21 and over. There are multiple political 
parties in Lebanon, and these organizations are personalistic in nature. Political blocs 
are usually based on religious or filial allegiance. The last parliamentary elections 
were conducted in 2009. 
Within government itself, women are very poorly represented. Out of 128 
parliamentary seats, only four are occupied by women, and there are no female 
ministers (Dr. Samira Aghacy,6 Author’s Interview, June 9, 2014; Khoury, 2013). 
Moreover, all women in political power are family members of male politicians. 
There are no female candidates who developed a political platform without an 
existing familial attachment to a man (Aghacy, Interview). Although 68% of the 
women in this sample support the introduction of gender quotas in parliament, as do 
64% of men, this policy has yet to be implemented in the Lebanese political system 
(IFES, 2010).  
                                                 
6 Dr. Samira Aghacy is the director of the Institute for Women’s Studies in the Arab World at the 





Political participation in Lebanon is heavily based on informal pork 
distribution along confessional lines. As illustrated by Samir Khalaf in his book Civil 
and Uncivil Violence in Lebanon, religious institutions and semi-feudal political 
leaders provide financial aid, job opportunities, and other such benefits. In fact, all 
institutions relevant to social welfare, such as orphanages, subsidized clinics, 
charities, and homes for the elderly are either religiously affiliated or run by a 
politician (Khalaf, 2002). At the political level, this leads to communal support for the 
politician who provides these services. 
One of many examples is that of the late Prime Minister Rafik el-Hariri’s 
Future Movement and the establishment of subsidized schools in underprivileged 
areas (Hariri Foundation, 2011). Announced as a project for sustainable human 
development, these subsidized schools revitalized impoverished areas and gave 
students from underprivileged backgrounds improved chances of educational and 
professional success. However, these schools are located in predominantly Sunni 
areas (Hariri Foundation, 2011), and while students from all religious backgrounds 
are welcome to attend, the majority ethno-religious composition of students are Sunni 
Muslim—the same sect as the former Prime Minister. Effectively, this enhanced in-
group solidarity within the Sunni community, and solidifies support for the Hariris as 
a political family. The Future Movement is not the only party that provides such 
services to the Lebanese, nor is it only the politicians who provide services to the 
Lebanese. 
 Religious institutions provide financial subsidies, schools, hospitals, 





provision of these assets does instigate a feeling of loyalty in those who use them, and 
as such, the religious institutions do have material power over their respective 
communities. This system of material assistance is set up on confessional lines, as 
political parties tend to align themselves according to religious denominations and 
religious institutions are explicitly pertaining to the religious sect. 
The consequence of the religious domination of community organization, is 
that the development of secular civic citizenship where political identity is affiliated 
with the state is undermined (Rola el-Masri7, Author’s Interview, July 14, 2014). 
These powerful non-state institutions take on the social welfare responsibilities of the 
state. As a result, powerful communal loyalty towards political leaders develops 
within members of the same religious community, and voters exercise their support 
by way of re-electing these leaders into office. This process makes the creation of 
new political parties very difficult, as such parties do not have the material capital 
necessary to attract potential voters away from more established parties. 
Moreover, as a result of this communal dynamic, voting is often a familial 
choice as opposed to an individual one in Lebanon. Typically, the patriarch of the 
family decides which politician should be voted for, and then he and the other 
members of his family vote for the candidate (Rita el-Chemaly8, Author’s Interview, 
August 9th, 2014). By that same token, it would be over-simplistic to assume that 
those within the family do not already share similar political beliefs, as across the 
                                                 
7 Mrs. Roula el-Masri is the Gender Equality and Programme Manager at the Abaad Resource Center 
for Gender Equality. This center offers not only programs to empower women economically, but also 
offers full-time counseling for men who have committed crimes of domestic violence. 
8 Mrs. Rita el-Chemaly is the Project Development Coordinator for the National Council of Lebanese 





world, political orientation tends to be built within the family unit (Alozie, Simon, 
and Merrill, 2003). What is unique in this instance, however, is that physically going 
to the polls is a familial exercise (Aghacy, Interview). While voting itself is secret, 
going to the polls together creates a sense of familial solidarity, and makes voting 
collective enterprise. This regulates the behavior of voters, and may leave them less 
free to make independent political choices.  
Religion, Legal Institutions, and Gendered Socio-Political Marginalization  
Political behavior is not only regulated through governmental institutions, but 
also through social institutions such as political parties, non-governmental 
organizations, and places of employment. On a legal level, behavioral regulation is 
also done through civil and religious courts. Legal institutions are perhaps among the 
most important institutions for behavioral regulation, as these courts lay the 
foundation for gender inequitable laws and permission for the violation of female 
bodily integrity in Lebanon. 
Religion is very relevant to the Lebanese power-structure, as the religious 
establishments hold considerable power over the behavior of their active 
congregations. Addressed in their study Predictors of Subjective Well-Being Among 
College Youth in Lebanon, Huda Ayyash-Abdo and Rayane Alamuddin assert that the 
religious apparatus is second only to that of the family in terms of significance, and 
the religiosity of the Lebanese is strong (Ayyash-Abdo & Alamuddin, 2007). The 
teachings of the religious institutions are internalized by most Lebanese, are thus 
powerful. The religious courts have authority over matters of personal status 





affiliated religious institutions (churches or mosques). For those who are believers, 
this leads to the support and endorsement of such courts. Indeed, in this sample, 65% 
of women are opposed to any change in how the marriage laws are structured, as are 
55% of men (IFES, 2010). 
The difficulty however, is that how these courts are structured increases the 
socio-vulnerability of women at three levels of legal obstacles: laws that explicitly 
discriminate against women, laws that are not enforced, and situations which the law 
does not address at all.  
Divorce 
Divorces are handled in the religious courts, and the laws pertaining to it vary 
across sects. Across Islamic sects, the right of divorce is that of the husband, and can 
only be granted to the wife with her husband’s explicit consent during the nuptial 
ceremony. The husband has the right to file for divorce on any grounds, and may 
divorce his wife against her wishes.  The woman must have specific circumstances 
under which she can file for divorce, and her husband must approve of her wish to 
divorce before it is granted. The grounds for a woman to call for divorce are: the 
husband’s inability to provide, maltreatment, sodomy, and apostasy. Should there be 
other reasons for divorce, the wife must forfeit her dowry in order to request a divorce 
(Fatme Ramadan9, Author’s Interview, Beirut, Lebanon November 7, 2009). In this 
context, the laws pertaining to men and women are explicitly different, and grant 
women fewer legal rights than men.    
                                                 





 In the Catholic sects, divorce is only allowed under specific circumstances: if 
either party has proven that he or she did not believe in the sanctity of marriage 
before the nuptials, if either party does not want to have children contrary to the 
wishes of their spouse, if either party is mentally incompetent or psychologically 
unable to handle being married, or if either party is physically unable to have sex, 
then a divorce may be granted (Mitri Nohra10,  Author’s Interview, Beirut, Lebanon, 
March 19, 2010).  Only in the Greek Orthodox sect are infidelity and domestic 
violence existing grounds for divorce (Nohra, Interview). In principle, the laws 
appear to be equitable, but they do not protect women from circumstances that they 
are more vulnerable to, such as spousal abuse.  
 Custody 
If Christians of any sect or Sunni Muslims choose to divorce, male children 
remain with their mother until age seven, and female children remain with their 
mother until age nine—after these turning points, the children are turned over to their 
father (Nohra, Interview). In the Shi’ite sect, male children remain with their mother 
until age two, and female children until age seven (Ramadan, Interview). In all cases, 
the wife is usually provided with child support by their father until he receives 
custody. In all sects, should the mother choose to remarry, she forfeits the right to 
custody, although this does not apply to the father. These laws discourage women 
from filing for divorce, or re-marrying should they choose to divorce, as the result 
will be a loss of custody of their children. 
                                                 





 There are a few exceptions where full custody would be given the mother. If 
the husband is proven to be mentally incompetent, unable to provide for the children 
financially, is proven to be an unethical or immoral influence (this usually involves 
evidence of alcoholism, drug abuse, child abuse, promiscuity, gambling, or apostasy), 
or if he chooses to grant custody to the mother (Charles Saqr11, Author’s Interview, 




Thus far, the laws that have been discussed govern behavior within the family, 
but none that relate to resources. This is a matter that is related to inheritance. 
Interestingly, inheritance law is governed by religious courts for Muslims, and by 
civil courts for Christians. The laws regarding Muslim inheritance laws are as 
follows. In all cases, the spouse receives one-fourth of the inherited wealth, and 
brothers inherit twice the estate of their sisters. One-third of the wealth can be willed 
freely. In the Sunni sect, if a man has no daughters, his wealth will go to his eldest 
paternal nephew (Ramadan, Interview). In the Shi’ite sect, the daughters will receive 
the full estate and divide it equally if there are no male siblings. In the Druze sect, one 
is free to delegate his or her wealth at will, regardless of the gender of one’s heirs 
(Saqr, Interview).   
The justification for the uneven division of wealth between daughters and 
sons is based on gender roles. Islamic law states that a man is legally bound to 
                                                 





support his wife and provide for her and, as previously stated, not doing so is grounds 
for divorce (Mahmassani, 1970). The logic follows that as it is the man’s job to 
provide for his family, his mother, and his unwed sisters, it makes sense for him to 
inherit more from his parents.  
The inheritance law for all Christians is as follows. If a person has one child, 
he or she is entitled to half of the estate, two children are inherited to one-third each, 
and three children are entitled to one-fourth each. The spouse is entitled to one-fourth, 
and any surviving parents are entitled to one-eighth of the estate.  If there is any 
remaining wealth, it is at the free disposal of the benefactor (Mahmassani, 1970). In 
principle, one must support all his or her children equally, regardless of their gender. 
However, many fathers will “sell” their family businesses to their sons, or place 
money aside in secret bank accounts that cannot be divulged owing to Lebanese 
banking secrecy laws (Zuhur, 2002). As such, men tend to receive more inherited 
wealth than daughters in Christian sects, too. While this is a behavioral tendency 
rather than a legal one, it also indicates that women have less access to family-related 
external resources than men.  
It is clear that how these courts are structured leaves women at increased risk 
for socio-political vulnerability and marginalization. In addition discussed the legal 
obstacles that women face due to religious laws, civil laws also greatly increase the 
vulnerability of women. The relationship between civil laws and extends further than 
dominance over one’s personal space with rape and abuse. Rather, civil laws which 





that women have with the state is different from that of men, and explicitly favors 
men over women. 
Civil Laws 
Laws that apply to all women pertain to citizenship, rape, and domestic 
violence. Men are allowed to grant their citizenship to foreign wives and their 
children, whereas women cannot (El-Khoury and Joulin, 2012). The laws pertaining 
to rape and domestic violence do not fully protect women from experiencing such 
crime, nor do they penalize their perpetrators fully. Under Lebanese law, a rapist is 
pardoned if he proposes marriage to his victim (Lebanese Penal Code, Art. 552). 
Until April 1st 2014, (which is after this IFES dataset was collected), domestic 
violence was not a crime in Lebanon (Human Rights Watch, 2014). While 
formalizing legislation about domestic violence is progress, the law falls short of 
protecting women from all forms of abuse. Marital rape is not criminalized, and while 
the law prohibits “acts that result in killing, harming,” and acts that result in 
“physical, psychological, sexual, or economic harm,” it does not explicitly 
incorporate crimes of assault or threats of this nature into the law (Human Rights 
Watch, 2014). Lastly, the legal space allowed to women for filing for restraining 
orders against abusive husbands is very narrow. The preservation of bodily integrity 
is not guaranteed under this law, which places women at increased risk of bodily 





Family, Political Marginalization, and Gendered Marginalization   
It is critical to indicate the informal (but equally powerful) social structures at 
work in Lebanon when considering the different legal spaces where women are at 
increased risk for socio-political vulnerability and marginalization. Family is the most 
important social institution in Lebanese society (Ayyash-Abdo and Alamuddin, 
2007). One can observe grandparents, brothers, uncles, cousins, and aunts living in 
close proximity to one another. Young people still maintain strong kinship ties, but 
these are generally based on relatedness to the nuclear family first (Khalaf, 2002). 
Family solidarity is hierarchical and patriarchal in nature, and as the most important 
social institution, governs the transmission of sociocultural values. Male births are 
preferred over female births in Lebanon, and many families give boys more privileges 
than girls (Ayyash-Abdo and Alamuddin, 2007). The father and the eldest adult son 
command the most respect, and are usually perceived as the decision-makers of the 
family.  
In contrast, women are generally perceived as in need of protection and care, 
and often face heavy discrimination in the workplace or on the job market. Indeed, 
female employment is most heavily concentrated in either in business as salespersons, 
in education as teachers, or in medicine as nurses (El-Masri, Interview). While 54% 
of college graduates in Lebanon are women, many do not work after they have 
children (Davies, 2012). At present, 23% of Lebanese women are employed 
(compared to men at 70.8%), and continue to generate less money than men (United 
Nations Development Programme, 2013). As a social mechanism related to bodily 





Lebanese women admitted to experiencing such harassment regularly (IFES, 2010). 
While there are no official statistics on domestic violence, private studies place the 
number at 35% (Usta, Farver, and Pashayan, 2007; United Nations Development 
Programme, 2009) 
 Throughout the Arab region, female public participation traditionally took the 
form of membership of social charities, and many aspects of this socio-political 
characteristic are still salient (Bayat, 2010). While Lebanon is no exception to this 
trend, female public participation is low—in this sample, approximately 5% of 
women join social organizations such as social charities or political parties (IFES, 
2010). In contrast, 13% of men are members of political parties (IFES, 2010). Much 
of this is due to the fact that when women do join political parties, they are not 
granted decision-making roles (El-Chemaly, Interview; Khoury, 2013). Indeed, in 
Christian political parties, a separate women’s branch is set up on the basis that 
members will address the social aspects of party membership, but women who join 
are not brought on to make political decisions (Rowayheb, 2014). In Muslim parties, 
women’s branches are not set up, but women are welcome to join the mainstream 
party. However, female candidates are not nominated for key roles within the party, 
and are not nominated as candidates for parliamentary elections (Rowayheb, 2014).  
The social and legal marginalization of women makes introducing measures 
that empower women and the introduction of gender-equitable laws difficult, as there 
are few resources from which women can draw in order to advocate for either social 





women due to legal and social obstacles, I now turn to investigate the mechanisms of 
these vulnerabilities, and examine their linkage to voting behavior. 
Methodology 
The International Foundation for Electoral Systems implemented a survey 
(conducted from 2009 to 2010) in Lebanon, Morocco, and Yemen in conjunction with 
local survey-statistic organizations. Titled “Status of Women in the Middle East and 
North Africa”, this survey’s purpose was to capture how women see themselves 
socio-politically (IFES, 2010). Structured as door-to-door interviews, the individual 
surveys were conducted as 47-minute oral interviews in Arabic, with only one adult 
member of each household being interviewed.  Across countries, the samples were 
stratified proportionately by governorate (IFES, 2010).  
77% of the respondents were from urban areas and 23% from rural areas, and 
data was gathered through multi-stage cluster sampling (IFES, 2010; Statistics 
Lebanon, 2009). There were 343 clusters, with each cluster containing 100-150 
households, and 8-10 households were selected from each cluster (Statistics Lebanon, 
2009). For the purposes of randomization, respondents within the home were selected 
using the Kish grid method, whereby adult members of the household are placed on a 
selection grid, and one member is selected based on a pre-existing algorithm intended 
to ensure accurate representation. There were 2000 women, and 750 men. The 
rationale for this was to have a robust sample of women. For the purposes of 
examining electoral behavior in Lebanon, all those under the age of 21 were dropped, 






 For the purposes of analysis, I have used general decomposition logistic 
models. This is done in order to compare the mechanisms that affect men and women, 
and to see if and how they differ. I conduct deeper analysis in a separate logistic 
model pertaining to women exclusively pertaining to multiple aspects of marital 
partnership.  
Results 
The general decomposition models are compartmentalized into three parts. 
The first is a logistic model conducted on women exclusively. The second is a logistic 
model conducted across the male sample exclusively. The third is an analysis 
comparing the results to each other. The variables included in this model link the 
constructs of personal space, bodily integrity, values, empowerment, interest, 
immersion in political networks, and demographics.  
The key independent variables explaining personal space and bodily integrity 
are complete freedom to leave the house; complete freedom to associate with people 
of one’s choosing; complete freedom to express one’s self; complete freedom to move 
publicly without fear; and experiencing regular public sexual harassment.  The 
variable indicating political interest is watching the news regularly. Variables related 
to gender-based values are endorsing women working outside the home and the 
justification of gender-based violence. Variables that measure empowerment are some 
university education, university-level education, and employment. Variables that 
measure demographics are religion, marriage, natural logarithm of age, and family 





member of a political party and former member of a political party. The dependent 
variable is whether or not one voted in the 2009 parliamentary elections.  
Table 1: Gendered Decomposition Models in Lebanon 
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     (.13) 
.320 
(.24) 
Constant 2.42 -.897 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.0502 0.1205 
 n=1648 n=630 
Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the  elections  
*** p˂ 0.001 ** p ˂ 0.01 * p ˂ 0.05 • p˂ 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses 





Table 2:  Decomposition Differentials for Lebanon 







































Religion and Transgressions of Personal Space: Women 
In examining the logistic model pertaining to women, the coefficient for the 
variable News is 0.405, and it is both substantively large and statistically significant at 
the p<.01 level. Interpreting this using log-odds ratios, we can see that women who 
watch the news regularly are 49% more likely to vote than those who do not 
(exp(0.405)=1.49. University-level Education has a large and statistically significant 
effect on voting behavior. Indeed, a woman who has a university degree is 77% more 
likely to vote than those who do not have a college degree (exp(.572)=1.77).  The 
coefficient for employment is statistically large and significant at the p<.05 level.  A 
woman who is employed is 37% more likely to vote than a woman who is not 
exp(.321)= 1.37). Married women are 83% more likely to vote than women who are 
not exp(.605)=1.83), and this is significant at the p<.05 level. Women who are 
interested in politics are 42% more likely to vote than women are not exp(.354)=1.42. 
In terms of ethno-political religious groupings, Women who are Maronite or 
Armenian Christians are more likely to vote than women of any other sect.  
In examining the variables that pertain to bodily integrity, women who feel 
completely free to leave the house without permission are 29% more like to vote than 
those who do not exp(.257)=1.29, and the coefficient for this variable is statistically 
significant at the p<.1 level. Interestingly, the impact of freedom to leave the house 
upon the propensity to vote varies among age cohorts. Returning to the trend that 
dominated women tend be younger, it is the most acute among women aged 20-29, 
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Note: Figure 2, the above plot, describes the marginal effect of feeling free to leave the house upon 
voting across age brackets. It compares those who report that they feel completely free to leave the 
home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Women who experience regular public sexual harassment are 33% less likely 
to vote exp(-.400)= 0.67, and this is significant at the p<.01 level. Women who were 
once members in a political party but are not anymore are 76% less likely to vote 
than women who are currently members exp(-1.41)=.24, and this result is statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level. Women who have never joined a political party are 
70% less likely to vote than women who are party members exp(-1.19)=.30, and this 





statistically significant at the p<.1 level, indicating a positive relationship between the 
progression of age and the propensity to vote. 
The implications of these results are intriguing, as it appears as though women 
are heavily positively influenced by mechanisms of empowerment such as education, 
employment, and membership in political networks, all of which are conduits to 
public resources. In contrast, women are negatively affected by incursions on their 
bodily integrity and personal space in the form of sexual harassment and restrictions 
upon their mobility. While mobility impacts voting behavior among younger age 
cohorts more strongly than women above their mid-forties, public harassment 
remains a problem for women across the sample. Though resource inequity is often 
linked to increased vulnerability to transgressioins against personal space, the effect 
of control over mobility on voting behavior is not grounded in experiencing lower 
levels of income in the Lebanese context. This is illustrated in Figure 7, located in 
Appendix 4.  
Interestingly, there is communal variation as to the types of violations of 
bodily integrity that women experience. Sixty percent of Sunni Muslim women 
surveyed said that they do not feel completely free to leave the house without 
permission, as did 58.5% of Shi’ite Muslim women (IFES, 2010). In contrast, 47% of 
Maronite Christian women said that they did not feel completely free to leave the 
house, as did 45% of Greek Orthodox Christian women (IFES, 2010). While these 
percentages are all quite high, the elevated levels in the Muslim sects could explain 
the reduced propensity to vote among Muslim women. In contrast, Christian women 





Christian women report frequent sexual harassment, as opposed to 28% of Sunni 
women and 22% of Shi’ite women (IFES, 2010). This could mean that the different 
types of violations of bodily integrity are actually concentrated within different ethno-
political groups, and result in reduced voter turnout. 
Religion and Voting Behavior: Men 
In the male logistic model, there are fewer variables which affect a man’s 
propensity to vote. They are religion, watching the news regularly, married, and 
membership in political parties. Men who watch the news regularly are 2.04 times 
more likely to vote than men who do not, exp(.716)=2.04, and this is significant at the 
p<.01 level. Similarly, men who are married are 2.25 times more likely to vote than 
men who are not exp(.813)=2.25, and this is significant at the p<.01 level. Men who 
are Christians of any denomination are more likely to vote than either Muslims or 
other non-Christians. Men who were once members of a political party but are not 
any longer are 72% less likely to vote than men who are current party members exp(-
1.27)=0.28, and this is statistically significant at the p<.05 level. Similarly, men who 
were never members of a political party are 81% less likely to vote compared to 
current party members exp(-1.61)=0.19.  
In comparing the sexes, it appears as though the empowering effects of 
education, employment, and interest in politics are more salient among women, while 
the negative effects of violations of bodily integrity are only salient among women. 
However, both men and women are affected by marriage, religion, and membership 
in a political party. Interestingly, men are more affected by marriage and membership 





participation in Lebanon, where men are the primary decision-makers of political 
action within the family unit, and are more likely to be approached by politicians for 
support if they are married.  
As the models compare to each other, the decomposition model provides 
estimates for subgroup characteristics, coefficients, and then calculates a raw 
differential comparing the two. Given that the Ω-characteristic value of women is -
0.097, it appears as though women would be predicted to vote less given the 
resources that they have. In contrast, the Ω-characteristic value of men is 0.067, 
indicating that men would be predicted to vote more given the resources at their 
disposal. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for women is 0.10, while 
the Ω coefficient for men is -0.06. The calculated raw differential is 0.006, which is 
insignificant. Ultimately, there is no difference in the rate of voting between men and 
women. 
 The possible reason for this is that although men appear to have more 
empowerment-tools resources than women in the form of education and employment, 
women tend to experience heavier empowerment effects once they are educated and 
employed. This dynamic creates an effect where the rates of male and female voting 









The Mechanisms of Marital Partnership 
Since there is no statistical difference in the rate of voting between the sexes, 
further attention is needed to examine subgroups of women that are most vulnerable 
to violations of bodily integrity in the form of domestic abuse, most notably married 
women. This model deals with voting in relation to domestic violence, 
verbal/emotional abuse, the ability to support one’s self, having independent savings, 
having independent property ownership, and the ability to make decisions regarding 
visiting family members, obtaining medical treatment, making home purchases, or 
inviting guests to the home. These are grouped together in that the variables 
pertaining to abuse are indicative of disempowerment, the ability to have control over 
one’s economic resources implies economic empowerment, and the ability to make 
decisions within one’s home is indicative of power dynamics. The table below 
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Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the  elections  




In terms of empowerment due to resources, women who own their own 
property are 79% more likely than women who do not. In dealing with matters 
pertaining to domestic abuse, women who experience verbal/emotional abuse are less 
likely to vote. Indeed, the coefficient for abuse is -0.393, and it is statistically 
significant at the p<.05 level. Using log-odds ratios exp(-0.393)=0.67, women who 
experience verbal or emotional abuse from their husbands are 33% less likely to vote 
than women who do not.  
 Interestingly, women who report verbal or emotional abuse also appear to 
have reduced access to public resources. Of the employed women in this study, 32% 
reported verbal/emotional abuse, as opposed to 68% of women who did not (IFES, 
2010). Similarly, women who report such abuse are also far less likely to be members 
of voluntary associations, such as social charities or political parties. Of women who 
reported membership in social charities, 75% of women do not report abuse, while 
25% do. Of women who are members of political parties, 68% do not report abuse, 
but 32% do. (IFES, 2010)  The data infers that the control exercised upon these 
women through abuse deprives them of the ability to access external resources, which 
empower them both personally and politically.    
As a proxy for experiencing domestic violence, I have taken the question 
“why do you think domestic violence happens” and used the response “because she 
deserved it” as a sign of attitudinal adaptive preference. I have done this as very few 
women openly admit to being beaten. This is likely a function of being interviewed in 
their homes where the probability of being overheard by a spouse or other family 





women indicated that if a woman is beaten it is because she deserved it, this appears 
to be unrelated to voting behavior. In terms of addressing partner dominance, most 
ecision-making processes appear to be joint as opposed to either the husband or the 
wife exclusively, and it appears as though home decision-making dynamics are not 
related to voting behavior. 
Results demonstrate that different mechanisms of economic empowerment 
(education, employment, and ownership) mobilize women to vote, while mechanisms 
of physical demobilization, such as being unable to leave the house freely, and 











In this chapter, the primary focus was on the relationship between 
transgressions upon personal space and voting behavior, and its organization among 
confessional lines. The relationship between transgressions on personal space and 
voting behavior appeared to be significant among women, with religion-based 
variations as to the degree and type of transgression that they experience. Christian 
women are more likely to experience sexual harassment in the street, while Muslim 
women are more likely to experience reduced levels of independence within the 
home.  The impact of restrictions of mobility on voting behavior appears to be 
stronger among women who are either in their mid-50s or below. Among both sexes, 
there are also religion-based variations in the propensity to vote, with Christians 
being the most likely to vote. 
 In the next chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Political Participation in the United States, results indicate that spousal control over 
mobility reduces the likelihood of voting among women, while the justification of 
female-to-male domestic violence reduces the likelihood to vote among men. 
Conversely, experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of 
education, employment, and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to 







Chapter 4: Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, 
and Political Participation in the United States 
 
In chapter III, the relationship between transgressions upon personal space 
upon voting behavior in Lebanon was discussed, and this relationship had variations 
among both sexes and religious sects. The relationship between transgressions on 
personal space and voting behavior appeared to be significant among women 
exclusively, with religion-based variations as to the degree and type of transgression 
that they experience. Christian women are more likely to experience public sexual 
harassment, while Muslim women are more likely to experience reduced levels of 
independence within the home.  The impact of restrictions of mobility on voting 
behavior appears to be stronger among women who are either in their mid-40s or 
below. There are also religion-based variations on the propensity to vote, with 
Christians being the most likely to vote. 
 In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Political Participation in the United States, results indicate that voter demobilization 
occurs among both sexes, though the violations of bodily integrity that cause voter 
demobilization are different. For women, the factor is spousal control over mobility. 
37% of women indicated that they feel the need to ask for confirmation from their 
spouse/significant other before leaving home independently, and of those who 
indicated restrictions, 31% did not vote, as opposed to 19% among those who 
indicated that did not report restrictions. Among men, those who justify female-to-





Experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, 
and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, 
membership in parties also increases the likelihood to vote.  
Gender, Government Institutions, and Voting Behavior 
The United States is a federal constitutional republic, in which the President 
of the United States (the head of state and head of government), Congress, and 
judiciary share powers reserved to the national government, and the federal 
government shares sovereignty with the state governments. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the focus is on federal government and presidential elections (as opposed 
to those that take place at the state level or local levels of governance). 
The executive branch is headed by the President and is independent of both 
the legislature and the judiciary. Legislative power is vested in the two chambers of 
Congress, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The judicial branch is 
composed of the Supreme Court and lower federal courts, exercises judicial power. 
The judiciary's function is to interpret the United States Constitution and federal laws 
and regulations. This includes resolving disputes between the executive and 
legislative branches. The federal government's layout is explained in the Constitution. 
Two political parties, the Democratic Party and the Republican Party, dominate 
American politics, and while there are also smaller parties such as the Tea party, the 
Coffee party, the Libertarian Party, the Green Party, and the Constitution Party, these 
parties have significantly less power in the legislative branch, and have never had a 





In the American context, both presidential and congressional elections take 
place. Presidential elections occur every four years in November. Unique to the 
United States is the presence of the electoral college in presidential elections. The 
Electoral College consists of 538 electors. A majority of 270 electoral votes is 
required to elect the President. Each state has an allotment of electors which is equal 
to the number of members in its Congressional delegation: one for each state member 
in the House of Representatives, and two for state senators. The electors are honor-
bound to vote for their state’s candidate of choice, which is indicated by popular vote.  
As gender applies to political representation, women are better represented in 
legislature in the United States than it is Lebanon. However, women are still 
underrepresented. Women constitute 19% of the delegates in the House of 
Representatives, and only 20% of senators are women. Historically, many women in 
American politics succeeded their husbands, though more female politicians are 
making independent entry into the political sphere in recent years. 
Gender equality is improving in American politics. Indeed, turnout has been 
higher among women than men since the 1980s (Center for American Women and 
Politics, 2015). However, they are less likely than men to run for political office, and 
are less likely to get elected (Lawless and Fox, 2012; Krook, 2010; Jenkins, 2005). 
However, men are more likely to report voting than women in survey data (Dr. 
Heather Ondercin12, Oral Communication with Author, Midwest Political Science 
Association Annual Conference, April 10, 2016). These trends are salient in the 
                                                 
12 Dr. Heather Ondercin is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Mississippi. 





dataset. 25% of women in this dataset did not vote, while only 15% of men did not 
vote.  
By this same token, the reported levels of turnout are elevated, as this would 
mean that 85% of men voted, and 75% of women did. In the national data, 53% of 
women voted in the 2012 presidential elections, while 47% of men did (Roper Center 
for Public Opinion Research, 2012). Over-reporting could be for two reasons. The 
first is that those who are both part of an online opt-in panel and are willing to take a 
survey related to politics are more politically inclined. The second is that voting is 
viewed as socially desirable behavior, and as such, is over-reported. Interestingly, 
men are more likely to over-report voting than are women in survey studies, which 
may explain the discrepancy in reported gender-based levels of turnout and actual 
levels of turnout (Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010; Dr. Heather Ondercin, Oral 
Communication with Author, Midwest Political Science Association Annual 
Conference, April 10, 2016).  This leads to some distortion of the significance of 
independent variables, with inflated levels of positive magnitude for variables which 
are in the same direction, and exaggerated levels of negative magnitude for variables 
which are in opposite directions (Bernstein, Chadha, and Montjoy, 2001). Among 
married men in particular over-reporting is apparent in this sample. This does have 
some implications for this study in the male sample; the over-reported figures for 
turnout and political affiliation for this are indicated in appendix 5.B.  
 Women are less likely to join political parties—28% of men are current 
members of political parties, while only 22% of women are. Traditionally, female 





school, church, and community organizations (Jenkins, 2005). Ultimately though, 
women have made great strides over time, and are starting to occupy more prestigious 
political positions than in prior years. 
Mechanisms Behind Voters’ Choices    
Unlike the Lebanese context, clientelism is not a factor in determining voter 
choice. Indeed, the dynamics of voter choice are fundamentally different in the 
United States, as social benefits are distributed through programmatic means.  
However, social networks are very important in facilitating not only voting, but also 
voter choice (Sokhey and McClurg, 2010;  Zuckerman, Valentino, and Zuckerman, 
1994).  
Social networks are created through multiple intersections of socio-political 
cleavages, most commonly those based on ethnicity, race, religion, language, 
occupation, and socio-economic status (Siegel, 2009; Brown and Brown, 2003;  
McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001). These often reinforce each other, as there 
is a strong degree of similarity in the characteristics of one’s socio-economic status, 
race, and occupation among persons in a close circle, and creating a sense of common 
socio-political identity (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, Cook, 2001; Brown and Brown, 
2003; Nieuwbeerta and Flap, 2000).  The more one’s social intimates are heavily in 
favor of a particular party, the higher likelihood of an individual voting for that 
particular party (Sokhey and McClurg, 2010; Siegel, 2009; Scholz and Wang, 2006; 





Emerging from the discussion of social networks is that of political affiliation. 
Persons who are either strong party affiliates or active members of political parties 
are much more likely to vote (Fowler and Kam, 2007; Holbrook and McClurg, 2005; 
Grofman, Owen, and Collet, 1999). This is perhaps intuitive, as those who have 
strong political leanings are more likely to practice civic engagement, join political 
parties, and thus, vote. However, it shold be noted that party affiliation in the United 
States has strong social demographic divisions. Supporters of the democratic party 
tend to be young, liberal, persons of racial minority status, and and are often women, 
while supporters of the republican party tend to be older, married, religious, and more 
conservative (Pew Research Center, 2015; Newport, 2014). By that same token, 
support for either party is often linked to economic preferences. Supporters of the 
democratic party tend to favor government social provision, while supporters of the 
republican party prefer limited government intervention regarding social welfare (De 
Neve, 2014; Brunner, Ross, and Washington, 2013; Manza and Brooks, 1999).   
It is perhaps obvious that there are other factors involved in the decision to 
vote or to refrain from doing so. Persons who have higher levels of education, 
employment, and income are more likely to vote (Hillygus, 2005; Grafsein, 2005; 
Copeland and Laband, 2002). Much of this is due to the fact that circulation in the 
public sphere in the form of educational institutions, places of employment, and 
community organizations are correlated with the development of civic skills, which 
results in an increased likelihood to vote (Brown and Brown, 2003; Schur, 2003; 





Social Norms and Gendered Marginalization 
Unlike the Lebanese context, where social marginalization is institutionalized, 
both men and women have equal rights under the law in the United States. However, 
the accessibility of socio-legal resources and treatment within the legal system is 
often related to gender, race, and socio-economic status. Persons of Hispanic or 
African-American descent face the highest levels of difficulty within the legal system, 
while Caucasians who have higher levels of socio-economic status are treated more 
leniently (Doerner and Demuth, 2010; Steffensmeier, Ulmer, and Kramer, 1998). 
Women of racial minority status also face legal discrimination compared to their 
female Caucasian counterparts, but as an aggregate group, women are treated more 
leniently than men are in the legal system (Doernet and Demuth, 2010; Griffin and 
Wooldredge, 2006).  As such, while all citizens are equal under the law in principle, 
the legal institutions do not work in a similar fashion across social groupings. 
As government intervention applies to the protection of bodily integrity, 
domestic violence is criminalized across all 50 states, and this has been the case since 
1994 (The Violence Against Women Act, 1994). The law establishes domestic 
violence as a crime against the state, has a pro-arrest stance against those who 
perpetuate domestic violence, and allowed victims to request protection orders 
against their abusers (Stop Abusive and Violence Environments, 2015; Uniform Law 
Commission, 2015). While this law has successfully reduced the rate of domestic 
violence perpetuated against women, it is still a problem in many households. 





the primary aggressors, leaving men vulnerable to arrest prematurely (Harry 
Crouch13, Author’s Interview, October 19, 2015).   
Perhaps as a reflection of social inequity within legal institutions, political 
marginalization is also entertwined across the axes of race, ethnicity, gender, and 
socio-economic status. Typically, women of lower socio-economic strata are the most 
marginalized, and are the least likely to participate politically (Ruth Glenn14, Author’s 
Interview, Oct. 27th, 2015; Wemlinger and Kropf, 2013; Kabeer, 2005). In the context 
of American voting behavior, poorer women are less likely to vote because they have 
less social capital, cannot afford to take the time off of work to go to the polls, or do 
not have the means to afford childcare which would leave them free to do so 
(Wemlinger and Kropf, 2013; Linda Berg15, Author’s Interview, October 19th, 2015).  
Moreover, women who are dominated at home or abused are also less likely to vote, 
as they have difficulty making independent decisions (Berg, Author’s Interview). 
Ultimately, women who are more vulnerable are the least likely to be represented. 
Methodology 
In this chapter, I guage the relationship between violations of personal space 
and voting behavior in the United States. In order to do so, I designed my own 
questionnaire, and conducted a 1,268 person survey through the use of Qualtrics, an 
online polling company. The sampling selection is done though an online opt-in 
panel, with a specific 65% female quota, which oversizes the female sample. For the 
                                                 
13 Mr. Harry Crouch is the President of the National Coalition for Men in San Francisco, California 
14 Ms. Ruth Glenn is the Executive Director of the National Coalition Against Domestic Violence in 
Denver, Colorado 






purposes of cost-effectiveness and ease of collecting data, this method was used. The 
median time to complete this survey was 11:23 minutes. Approved on July 2nd, 3015 
by the University of Maryland Internal Review Board, the full text of this 
questionnaire is featured in Appendix 5.A.  
Admittedly, this sampling method is different from that of the door-to-door 
Kish-grid, and raises concerns about the sampling frame. Members of online panels 
tend to be younger and wealthier than the general population, which raises concerns 
about accurate sampling representation (Hays, Liu, and Kapteyn, 2015). Moreover, 
online respondents are subject to online response conditioning, answering too fast, 
and satisficing with their responses (Callegaro, Baker, Bethlehem, Görick, Krosnick, 
and Lavrakas, 2014; Hays, Liu, and Kapteyn, 2015). Factors that mitigate the 
negative aspects of such a sampling frame are the fact Qualtrics drops surveys which 
have high levels of non-response, those who answer too quickly, randomizes its 
selection of participants within its panels, uses refocus questions, and tries to structure 
the study such that the sample has similar demographics to that of census data 
(Ashley McWhorter16, Written Communication with Author, August 11, 2015; 
Hewson, forthcoming; Qualtrics, 2014). 
In this particular study, there is an oversized proportion of women; there are 
834 women and 434 men. All of those sampled are above 18, and the age range is 
from 18-88. In terms of geographic distribution, 30% of this sample live in cities, 
47% live in the suburbs, and 23% live in rural areas.  
                                                 






For the purposes of these models in particular, those who are either married or 
in a relatiosnhip were those that were tested. The reason for this is that in the 
Lebanese sample, both those who are married and single live with family members 
(either spouses or parents), thus making familial control over mobility a salient 
feature independent of marital status. However, this living pattern was not salient in 
the American sample; a negligible number of single persons lived with family 
members. Thus, it made substantive sense to structure the models in this fashion. 
Models one and two are different in that the first model makes a specific 
direction about domestic violence concerning men to women, while the second model 
specifies from women to men. All other variables are the same. The general 
decomposition models are compartmentalized into three parts. The first is a logistic 
model conducted on women exclusively. The second is a logistic model conducted 
across the male sample exclusively. The third is an analysis comparing the results to 
each other. The variables included in this model link the constructs of personal space, 
bodily integrity, values, empowerment, interest, immersion in political networks, and 
demographics. 
The key independent variables explaining personal space and bodily integrity 
are complete freedom to leave the house; complete freedom to associate with people 
of one’s choosing; complete freedom to express one’s self; justification of male-to-
female domestic violence, justification of female-to-male domestic violence, 
verbal/emotional abuse, and experiencing regular public sexual harassment.  The 
three variables indicating political interest are watching televised news regularly, 





that measure empowerment are university-level education, and employment. 
Variables that measure demographics are ethnicity, marriage, natural logarithm of 
age, region, and family income. The variables that measure immersion in political 
networks are never a member of a political party and former member of a political 
party. The dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the 2012 presidential 
elections.  All models are run as two-tailed tests at 95% confidence. 
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Constant -5.61 -1.06 -5.31 -3.89 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.2772      0.3941 0.2748 0.4065 
 n=530 n=288 n=530 n=288 
Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections  








Table 5:  Model 1 Decomposition Differentials for the United States 































Table 6:  Model 2 Decomposition Differentials in the United States 
































Model 1: Women, Demobilization, and Control Over Mobility 
 
Indicated in both models, men and women are mobilized and demobilized by 





women are more likely to vote if they have higher levels of income, and more likely 
to vote as age increases. Indicated in the graph below, women who experience lower 
levels of income are more likely to experience the demobilizing effects of 
transgressions against personal space. 
 
Figure 3: The Marginal Effect of Freedom to Leave the House on Voting Across Income 
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Note: Figure 3, the above plot, is based on Model 1. It describes the marginal effect on leaving the 
house on voting across the natural logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they 
feel completely free to leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas 
are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Also, women are 2.16 times more likely to vote if they feel completely free to 





below, similar to the Lebanese sample, the propensity to vote decreases the most 
among younger women. 
 
Figure 4: The Marginal Effect of Leaving the House on Voting Across Age Brackets 
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Note: Figure 4, the above plot, is also based on Model 1. It describes the marginal effect on leaving the 
house on voting across age brackets, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to 
leave the home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence 
intervals.  
 
Women who complete a university-level education are 2.80 times more likely 
to vote than who do not exp(1.03=2.80). Most importantly,  women who express an 
interest in politics are over six times more likely to vote than women who do not 
exp(1.90)=6.68. Lastly, women who are from the Midwest are over two times more 





In this model, men who are married are over five times more likely to vote, 
but this variable does not seem to significantly affect women in this sample 
exp(1.69)=5.4. Men who express interest in politics are 18 times more likely to vote 
than men who are not exp(2.90)=18.17. Men who are employed are 3.4 times likely 
to vote than men who are not exp(1.35)=3.4.17 
Model 2: Men, Demobilization, and Justification of Domestic Violence  
In Model 2, the results for women largely echo those in Model 1. Once again, 
indicated by the natural logarithm of household income, women are more likely to 
vote if they have higher levels of income, and with the increase of age. The 
significance of independent mobility is also clear, as once again, women are 2.17 
times more likely to vote if they feel completely free to leave the house than women 
who do not  exp(.778)=2.17. Women are 2.63 times likely to vote if they have a 
university education exp(.963)=2.63. A woman  is over six times more likely to vote 
if she is interested in politics exp(1.90)=6.68. Lastly, women who are from the 
Midwest are over two times more likely to vote than women from the South 
exp(.799)=2.22. 
There are two changes which are salient among men in Model 2. Firstly, men 
who believe that women hit men because men provoke the incident are 72% less 
likely to vote than who do not exp(-1.25)=.28. Indicated in the graph below, this 
effect starts to take place when men are in their early thirties, but not earlier.  This 
                                                 
17 Owing to over-reporting, the magnitude of these figures is somewhat inflated. According to the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study conducted by Harvard & MIT, married men were 3 times 
more likely to vote than those who are unmarried in the 2012 presidential elections; 81% of men in this 
poll indicated that they had voted. In the General Social Survey conducted by the University of 
Chicago, married men were 2.3 times more likely to vote than unmarried men in the 2012 elections; 





could be related to the age bracket within which men engage in committed 
relationships, and are more likely to be “locked in” with a potential abuser. In this 
sample, the proportion of men aged from 18-29 whom are married is 28%, but jumps 
to 60% from age 30-39, and fluctuates minimally as the age brackets increase. 
 
Figure 5: The Marginal Effect of the Justification of Domestic Violence Against 
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Note: Figure 5, the above plot, is based on Model 2. It describes the marginal effect of reporting 
justification of domestic violence on political participation across age brackets, comparing those who 
indicate justification to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Men who identify as independent are less likely to vote than those who 
identify as democrats. Specifically, men who claim neither affiliation are 78% less 





remain similar. Men who are employed are 4.4 times more likely to vote exp(1.40). 
Lastly, men who are interested in politics are 12 times more likely to vote than men 
who do not exp(2.48)=12. 
The decomposition model provides estimates for subgroup characteristics, 
coefficients, and then calculates a raw differential comparing the two. In Model 1,  
the Ω-characteristic value of women is -0.102, it appears as though women would be 
predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. The Ω-characteristic value 
of men is -0.145, indicating that men would also be predicted to vote less given the 
resources at their disposal. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for 
women is 0.008, while the Ω coefficient for men is 0.051. The calculated raw 
differential is -0.093, indicating that women are less likely to vote than men are. This 
is substantiated by a t-test run at 95% significance, with a p-value of 0.0001.  
In Model 2, the Ω-characteristic value of women is -0.094, it appears as 
though women would be predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. 
The Ω-characteristic value of men is -.110, indicating that men would also be 
predicted to vote less given their existing resources. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, 
the Ω coefficient for women is 0.0002, while the Ω coefficient for men is .016. The 
calculated raw differential is -0.093, indicating that once again, women are less likely 
to vote than men are. This is also substantiated by a t-test run at 95% significance, 
with a p-value of 0.0001. 
As these results relate to violations of personal space, it appears as though 
women and men are affected by violations of bodily integrity, and to differing 





Indeed, dominance in the home reduces independence, thus depressing the probability 
of political participation (Berg, Author’s Interview). The justification of domestic 
violence generated from women towards men reduces the male propensity to vote. 
This indicates that violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters in both sexes. 
The justification of domestic violence against men among men in this dataset 
at 35%. Interestingly, the rate of justification of violence against women by men is 
also higher, at 28%. One of the many explanations for this is that in cultures of 
patriarchy, violence is more accepted (Glenn, Author’s Interview). However, what is 
of particular interest is that the rate of justification of violence against men is higher 
than that of violence against women. 
This is due to many factors, the first being that the public conceptionalization 
of domestic violence is based of men being the aggressors, while women are the 
victims (Dutton and Corvo, 2007). This has been institutionalized at the level of 
policy, with the result being that social welfare institutions are significantly more 
likely to accommodate mothers and children who are victims of abuse, but far fewer 
institutions address the needs of men (Crouch, Author’s Interview). Many institutions 
do not accommodate male victims,  and as such, there are fewer resources which 
abused men can turn to (Glenn, Author’s Interview). Chronic exposure to domestic 
violence without any recourse often leads to its justification as a practice (Crouch, 
Author’s Interview).    
These findings have important implications for the analysis of voting 
behavior.  The experience of political demobilization due to transgressions upon 





Table 7: Relationship between Marital /Cohabitational Power Dynamics and 
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Constant .656 1.33 
Pseudo R-
Sq 
0.0846  0.1431  
 n=483 n=243 
Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections  





Marital/Co-habitational Dynamics and Voting Behavior 
In this sample, respondents who were either a) married or b) unmarried and 
cohabitating with their significant others’ were asked questions concerning power 
dynamics within their homes. This was done in order to gauge as to whether or not 
power dynamics have a demobilizing effect on voting behavior when living in the 
same place.  
Once again, among this population, it appears as though the justification of 
domestic violence against one’s own sex demobilizes men, but not women. Indeed, 
married/cohabitating men who endorse domestic violence against their own sex are 
63% less likely to vote than men who do not, and this is significant at 90% 
confidence levels exp(-.972)=.37. Interestingly, decision-making dynamics do not 
demobilize either sex politically, while mechanisms of empowerment such as 
property ownership increase the propensity to vote among both sexes. Indeed, women 
who own property are nearly three times more likely to vote than women who do not 
exp(1.06)=2.88, while men are nearly four times more likely to vote if they own 
property exp(1.30)=3.60. The empowering effect of self-sustainability is only salient 
among women in this sample; women who can support themselves are over two times 










In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Political Participation in the United States, the results indite that voter 
demobilization occurs among both sexes. For women, the factor is spousal control 
over mobility, and this is significant across all age groups. Among men, the 
demobilizing factor is the justification of female-to-male domestic violence, but this 
becomes significant among men above the age of 30. Conversely, experiencing 
empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, and respect 
for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, membership in parties 
also increases the likelihood to vote. More broadly, in comparing these two countries, 
it is clear that the demobilization effects of transgression of bodily integrity occur 
across electorates, and the empowerment mechanisms of education, employment, and 
higher levels of income function similarly. Lastly, having an interest in politics 
naturally enhances the propensity to vote. 
Among married/cohabitating couples, it appears as though transgressions 
upon personal space only demobilize men, and not women. This is surprising and has 
profound implications for addressing the needs of vulnerably men, as women are 
often thought to be the exclusive victims of domestic violence or abuse, when this is 
clearly not the case. 
In the next chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The 
Cases of Morocco and Yemen, the results indicate significant variation in the display 
of political demobilization due to violations of personal space. In Morocco, women 





education and employment do not empower women politically. However, in Yemen, 
a reverse trend is seen.  Spousal control over mobility does not demobilize women 
politically, but education and employment and employment significantly propel 




Chapter 5: Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: 
The Cases of Morocco and Yemen 
In the last chapter, Bodily Transgressions, Interpersonal Relationships, and 
Political Participation in the United States, the results show that voter demobilization 
due to bodily transgressions occurs among both sexes, albeit differently. For women, 
the critical factor is spousal control over mobility, while the justification of female-to-
male domestic violence reduces the likelihood to vote for men. Conversely, 
experiencing empowerment mechanisms such as higher levels of education, income, 
and respect for bodily integrity increase the likelihood to vote. Moreover, 
membership in parties also increases the likelihood to vote, as does having an interest 
in politics. 
In this chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The Cases 
of Morocco and Yemen, there is significant variation as to the degree to which 
violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters. In Morocco, 57% of women who said 
they felt restricted did not vote, compared to 50% of women said that they feel free to 
leave the home. In Yemen, 46% of women of women who did not feel free to leave 
the house did not vote, compared to 36% of women who experience freedom of 
mobility. In Morocco, women who do not feel free to leave the house also experience 
voter demobilization, but education and employment do not empower women 
politically. In contrast, education and employment significantly propel women into 








Morocco and Yemen are two countries in the Arab world that are different in 
many ways. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy characterized by liberal legal 
reform as of 2004 and onwards, while Yemen has among the heaviest restrictions 
imposed on women in the world. Yemen is the only country featured in this study 
where there are legal restrictions placed upon independent female mobility. Placed 
alongside the United States and Lebanon, the four create the opportunity to examine 
the relationship between transgressions upon personal space and voter demobilization 
across a spectrum of legally defined public and private freedoms accorded to women. 
The United States is the most liberal, while Yemen being the most conservative.  
The Moroccan Political Arena 
Moroccan society is predominately Sunni Muslim, with ethno-political 
cleavages between those who identify as Berber, and those who identify as Arab. 
Having transformed during the Arab Spring, the Moroccan system of governance is 
that of a constitutional monarchy.  The 2011 reforms gave more power to the 
parliament, the office of the prime minister, and reduced the powers of the King. The 
Moroccan parliament is bi-cameral in nature, and the 395-seat House of 
Representatives is elected by popular vote, while the 270-seat House of Councillors is 
elected by local councils, professional chambers, and labor unions (Madani, 
Maghraoui, and Zerhouni 2012).  Moroccan civil society allows for multiple political 
parties, and these are characterized as being either religious or secular (National 





Similar to the Lebanese context, clientelist voting is largely linked with party 
support for the Islamist Justice and Development Party (PJD), as it is the dominant 
force in Moroccan politics (Hamzawy, 2008).  An opposition movement which was 
later coopted into the government, the PJD functions as a provider of social services 
and charitable work to poorer Moroccans (Binoual 2011).  Its tripartite status—an 
Islamist party, a local movement that emerged in opposition to the power of the 
monarchy, and a provider of social welfare has earned widespread support among the 
Moroccan electorate (García-Rivero and Kotzé 2007).   
Morocco is characterized as being in democratic transition, but still patriarchal 
in its social character (Laskier, 2003).  In the IFES dataset, 62% of Moroccan female 
respondents admitted that they did not feel free to leave the house independently. The 
personal status laws are heavily related to these characterizations. Indeed, though 
women and men have equal participatory rights, once again, matters pertaining to 
personal status are governed by the religious courts, and these courts usually favor 
men over women.   
This being said, gender equality has gained headway in Morocco under the 
Moudawana law, which was passed in 2004 (Moudawana, Preamble).  Women are 
now able to arrange their own marriages without the consent of a male guardian, and 
female marital age was raised to 18 (Moudawana, Art.19).  In addition, men who 
want to engage in polygamy must have the legal consent of their existing spouses 
before doing so. Women can now initiate divorce on the grounds of disrespect, harm, 
non-maintenance, latent defect, abstinence, or abandonment (Moudawana Art.98). 





grounds for divorce in the Moudawana legal code. Indeed, neither is a crime in 
Morocco. Moreover, men can initiate divorce on any grounds. Brothers are entitled to 
twice the inheritance of sisters (Moudawana Art.174).  Ultimately, men have more 
positive rights than do women, while women are still vulnerable to violations of their 
bodily integrity under law. 
In terms of public sexual harassment, Morocco has laws that protect women 
from sexual harassment at work, but not on public streets. Ultimately, women are less 
protected than men in both the public and private public spheres, and have limitations 
on the accessibility of familial financial resources.   
Demobilizing Cultural Norms among Moroccan Women 
Patriarchy is a salient feature of Moroccan culture, as is the gendered 
separation between public and private spaces (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006).  The public 
space, defined as places of work, the market, and street, are social spaces for men, 
whereas the home and public bath are the primary social spaces for women (Belarbi 
1997; Bourqia 1997).  While this is changing as more women join the workforce, 
women tend to be excluded from high-paying jobs, and face discrimination when on 
the job market (Ennaji 2004b; Filiali-Meknassi 1994). A woman’s first 
responsibilities are towards her family, and employment is considered only if 
financially necessary (Sadiqi and Ennaji 2006).  
The ratio of formally employed women in this sample is 11%, which is under-
representative of the proportion of women who work in Morocco (IFES, 2010). The 





Interestingly, informal family-based employment or self-employment is very 
common among women in Morocco, and is particularly salient in the agricultural and 
textile industries (Angel-Urdinola and Tanabe, 2012).  While this provides women 
with some income, it does not provide them with social services linked to formal 
employment or include them in the public sphere, as many women are working either 
within their homes or in very limited public circles. Moreover, while there are no 
legal restrictions on female mobility, the practice of not leaving the home without a 
male guardian is still salient, particularly in rural areas (S. Tang18, Oral 
Communication with Author, Women in the Middle East Political Sphere Workshop, 
Project on Middle East Political Science Conference, March 11, 2016).  These 
dynamics create an informal system whereby employment does not motivate women 
to participate politically in ways that are salient in Lebanon, the United States, and 
Yemen.  
The Yemeni Political Scene 
Unlike Morocco, Yemen’s social cleavages are both tribal and religious in 
nature. A heavily tribal society with 66% of its population living in rural areas, 
clientelism is a salient characteristic of Yemeni voting behavior (World Bank, 2014; 
Corstange, 2010). Unlike the United States, Lebanon, or Morocco, Yemen 
experienced division and reunification in tandem with the rise and fall of the Soviet 
Union. Northern Yemen was its own state, allied with the U.S. and Western powers, 
while Southern Yemen was Soviet-backed (Brehony, 2013). Shortly after the Soviet 
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Union collapsed, the Republic of Yemen (ROY) was declared on 22 May 1990 as a 
parliamentary republic, with Ali Abdullah Saleh becoming President and Ali Salem 
al-Baidh Vice President. Yemen is a republic with a bicameral legislature. Under the 
constitution, an elected president, an elected 301-seat House of Representatives, and 
an appointed 111-member Shura Council share power (Constitution of Yemen, 
Articles 62-64, 108).  The president is head of state, and the prime minister is head of 
government. Suffrage is universal for those over 18 (Yemeni Const. Art. 64). Unlike 
the Lebanese, American, or Moroccan electoral systems, Yemenis elect their 
president by popular vote between candidates that are endorsed by parliament 
(Yemeni Const., Art. 64).  The last parliamentary elections were in 2003, and the last 
presidential and local council elections were in 2006.  
Similar to the Lebanese context, armed conflict is a part of the Yemeni 
political scene. In 1994, armed groups in Southern Yemen attempted to split the 
country again, though this attempt failed (Brehony, 2013; Al-Moushky, 2013). 
Initiated in 2004, a Houthi insurgency is ongoing in Yemen, and has resulted in a 
coup in 2014 (BBC, 2015).    
Tribal favoritism and paternalism are salient characteristics of Yemeni voting 
behavior (Saif 2000). Tribal leaders are central to Yemeni politics, and use rewards in 
the form of development projects, jobs, or basic goods to secure votes (Corstange, 
2010; Clark, 2004). This is particularly salient when analyzing the voting behavior of 
those who support the opposition reform movement, the Islah party (Clark, 2004).  
Such rewards mobilize poorer Yemenis to the polls, as in many instances, such 





Demobilizing Cultural Norms Among Women 
Yemen is described as patriarchal and traditional in nature (Manea, 2010; 
Badran, 1998). As patriarchy relates to personal space, Yemen, 61.84% of female 
respondents stated that they feel restricted when leaving the house.  The country’s 
social sphere is characterized by tribalism (often in the context of the Northern-
Southern divide) and homosociality (Meneley, 2007).  Social loyalty is towards one’s 
family and on a political level, towards one’s tribe and kinship (Dresch and Heykel, 
1995; Saif, 2000). Social gatherings tend to be gender-segregated, and women meet 
almost exclusively within the home. Men are more likely to enjoy social gatherings 
with other men in public, and political discussions often occur during qat chews, 
which are exclusively male (Badran, 1998; Wedeen, 2007). This is not to imply that 
women do not discuss politics, but rather that the only available space for them to do 
so is at home (Badran, 1998).   
Though Yemen has elements of the Napoleonic code in its legal system, the 
constitution describes the Sharia as the source of law (Yemeni Const., Art. 3).  While 
men and women are given voting rights, their legal ability to participate in the public 
sphere is unequal, as are their entitlements by the religious courts. 
The difference in socio-legal contracts between men and women is very stark 
in Yemen. A woman is unable to obtain a personal identity card, a passport, or get 
married without the consent of either her husband or her closest male relative, 
although adult men do not need permission from guardians (Basha, Ghanem, and 
Abdulhafid, 2005; Manea, 2010).  There is no legal recourse for women who 





2007). In terms of religious family law, wives have restricted grounds for divorce, 
brothers are entitled to twice the inheritance of sisters (Basha, Ghanem, and 
Abdulhafid, 2005). Relating to personal space, a woman cannot leave the house 
without the permission of either her husband or her father, and in non-urban spaces, 
women can be detained and arrested for being seen with a man who is not their 
relative (Manea, 2010).   
Laws pertaining to sexual harassment fall under the broad category of 
disgraceful conduct with a female in public, but do not specifically define sexual 
harassment. In practice, women who experience sexual harassment rarely report it, as 
social tradition stigmatizes women experience public harassment.  Ultimately, female 
mobility is not only unprotected in the Yemeni case, but it is also legally restricted, 
which has heavy implications for the ability of women to participate politically.  
Methodology 
In Yemen, the sample was 500 men and 2000 women.  The sampling strategy 
was multi-stage, stratified, probability proportional to size (PPS).  The survey was set 
up such that there were 250 primary sampling points, with each sampling point 
consisting of 80-120 households (Yemen Polling Center, 2010). At each sampling 
point, houses were selected in a (6+1) fashion, or rather, every seventh house. 10-12 
interviews were conducted per sampling point, and selection of the interviewee within 
the home was done by the Kish Grid method. The gender breakdown of respondents 
per set of interviews was 75% female, 25% male. Owing to the social structure of the 





governorates except Al-Maharah were sampled because only 0.5% of Yemen’s 
population resides there. 
 In Morocco, the sample size was such that there are 2000 women and 500 
men. The sampling strategy was multi-stage, stratified, probability proportional to 
size (PPS) across all 16 governorates (LMS-CSA, 2009; Rola Abdul-Latif19, phone 
communication with author, April 18, 2014). There were 255 primary sampling 
points, with 8-12 interviews per sampling point (LMS-CSA, 2009; Abdul-Latif, 
phone communication with author). The households were selected in a (1+ skip 
number), or rather, every other house (LMS-CSA 2009). For the purposes of 
randomization, all respondents within the home were selected using the Kish grid 
method. 60.8% of respondents came from urban areas, while 39.2% came from rural 
ones (LMS-CSA, 2010).  
Research Design 
In this chapter, I created two natural decomposition models, intended to 
examine the full samples of Morocco and Yemen respectively. After this, I ran two 
logistic regressions across a sample of married women in each country in order to 
examine the mechanisms of marital partnership. All tests are two-tailed, and are run 
at 95% significance. 
 In the context of the natural decomposition models, the key independent 
variables linked to bodily integrity are sexual harassment, freedom to leave the home 
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without permission from family members, freedom to associate, freedom to express 
one’s self, and freedom to move publicly without fear. In terms of values, I chose to 
examine working outside of home and the justification of gender-based violence. In 
terms of mechanisms of empowerment, I chose to examine education and 
employment. For the purposes of demographics, I chose to examine age, income, and 
in the Moroccan context, Berber minority status. I also chose to examine Interest in 
politics in order to test one’s existing inclinations. In the Moroccan model, the 
dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the last parliamentary elections. In 
the Yemeni model, the dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the last 
presidential elections. 
 The model built for the purposes of investigating Yemeni voting behavior 
accommodates for significant geographical variation. The reason for this is that unlike 
any other country discussed thus far, Yemen experienced division and reunification in 
1990. The Southern territory used to be its own sovereign nation, and I wanted to see 
if residence in a part of Yemen which used to be its own state would demobilize 
voters. Furthermore, in the Northern region, local religious leaders have stronger 
influence over citizen political behavior than the existing state apparatus. In the East, 
there is a strong tribal presence, where loyalties to tribal leaders are often the defining 
mechanisms behind political behavior (Rola Abdul-Latif, Electronic Correspondence 
with Author, May 26, 2015). Unlike the models illustrating political behavior in 
Lebanon, the United States, or Morocco, there is no explicit mention of minority 





 In the logistic models pertaining to married women, I chose to examine the 
relationship between decision-making dynamics between spouses, the experience of 
verbal/emotional abuse, the justification of domestic violence, and the ability to 
support one’s self and property ownership (i.e: command over material resources). In 
the Yemeni context, I also included a variable indicating as to whether or not the 
woman was alone while being interviewed, as Yemeni cultural norms often do not 
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Constant -1.91*** -1.58*** -1.75*** -.863 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.0795 0.1111 0.1143 0.2342 
 n=1,898 n=491 n=1283 n=477 
Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections  
*** p˂ 0.001 ** p ˂ 0.01 * p ˂ 0.05 • p˂ 0.1 (Standard Errors of the Coefficients are in Parentheses 
 
 
Table 9:  Morocco Decomposition Differentials 












































Table 10:  Yemen Decomposition Differentials 


































In the Moroccan context, Berber minority status, marriage, and age play a 
significant role in increasing the propensity to vote among both sexes. Women who 
identify as Berber and speak Berber at home are 40% more likely than women who 
identify as Arabs and speak Arabic at home exp(.343)=1.40. Among men, those who 
identify as Berber and speak Berber at home are 2.32 times more likely to vote than 
men who identify as Arabs and speak Arabic at home. At first glance, it would appear 
as though minority status in Morocco functions as an empowerment factor in the 
Moroccan context.  
This is unlikely though, as Moroccan Berbers have a history of experiencing 
social and linguistic marginalization. Relevant to this particular election, a campaign 
held to make Amazigh (language of the Berbers) an official language alongside 
Arabic, (which was officially tabled by referendum at the 2011 parliamentary 





2011). It appears as though the minority mobilized in response to a particular event, 
as opposed to being an exceptionally motivated socio-political cleavage. 
  Marriage increases the propensity to vote among both sexes. Indeed, women 
are 39% more likely to vote if they are married exp(.331)=1.39, and men are 80% 
more likely to vote if they are married exp(.588). In both cases, an increase in age 
also indicates an increase in the probability to vote. Interestingly, the demobilizing 
effect of control over mobility is also clear in the Moroccan sample. Women who feel 
completely free to the leave the home are 34% more likely to vote than women who 
do not exp(.295)=1.34. The effect of this significantly decreases by the time women 
are in their mid-50s. Similar to the Lebanese case, the effect of freedom to leave the 
house on voting across age brackets is not grounded in experiencing lower levels of 


















Figure 6: Effect of Freedom to Leave the House on Voting Across Age Brackets 















18 28 38 48 58 68 78 88
Age
Not Completely Free Completely Free
Free vs. Not Free to the Leave the House
 
Note: Figure 6, the above plot, describes the marginal effect of feeling free to leave the house on 
voting across age brackets, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the 
home without familial approval to those who do not. The grey areas are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 
Moreover, women who express an interest in politics are 38% more likely to vote 
than women who do not exp(.325)=1.38.  
Perhaps surprisingly, interest in politics does not impact the propensity to vote 
among men. However, employment increases the propensity to vote among men by 
81%, exp(.594)=1.81, but employment does not empower women in this sample. This 
is likely because much of female labor in Morocco is through informal means, and 
often this labor is conducted at home. While this allows women to generate additional 





mobilizing effects of employment is reduced. However, women who agree that it is 
acceptable for women to work outside of the home are more than twice as likely to 
vote than women who do not exp(.737)=2.08.  
The model indicates that among men, those who feel free to express 
themselves are less likely to vote by 61%. However, this is likely a substantively 
insignificant result, as the inability to express one’s self freely would not mobilize 
one to vote more than one who is free to speak their mind.  
The decomposition model provides estimates for subgroup characteristics, 
coefficients, and then calculates a raw differential comparing the two. Given that the 
Ω-characteristic value of women is 0.011, it appears as though women would be 
predicted to vote more given the resources that they have. In contrast, the Ω-
characteristic value of men is -0.028, indicating that men would be predicted to vote 
less given their resources. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for women 
is -0.105, while the Ω coefficient for men is -0.065. The calculated raw differential is 
-0.094. According to the IFES dataset, more men than women vote in Morocco.  46% 
of women voted in comparison to 55% of men. Substantiated by a t-test, it appears 
that men vote more than women do in the Moroccan context, and this is statistically 
significant at the p <.01 level. 
Yemen 
The Yemeni context is different from the Lebanese, American, or Moroccan 
cases. Yemen is the most restrictive environment for women, and since its last 





relationship between incursions upon personal space and bodily integrity across the 
spectrum of gender-based inclusive environments, Yemen is a good case study for 
extreme restrictions. 
Among women, those who are employed are 76% more likely to vote than 
those who are not exp(.566)=1.76. Women who have completed university education 
are three times more likely to vote than women who have not exp(1.11)=3.03. While 
it is clear that the empowering mechanisms of education and employment are 
significant in explaining female Yemeni voting behavior, formal employment and 
higher education among women in Yemen are not widespread; the reported rate is 
12%, while this sample underestimates the ratio at 7% (World Bank, 2010; IFES, 
2010). However, unlike Morocco, informal employment is not a salient feature of 
female workplace dynamics, thereby allowing women who do work to experience 
public exposure—thereby mobilizing them.  
Along the same thread of political exposure, women who watch the news 
regularly are 79% more likely to vote than women who do not exp(.585)=1.79. 
Perhaps relatedly, women who express an interest in politics are 33% more likely to 
vote than women do not exp(.288)=1.33.  
  Similar to the Moroccan sample, women who endorse the belief that women 
should work outside of the home are over two times more likely to vote than women 
who do not exp(.787)=2.19. Women who feel to express themselves are 59% more 





Delving into the topic of regional distribution, it appears as though both men 
and women who are from Southern Yemen are the least likely to vote. This is perhaps 
expected, as Southern Yemen was once its own nation, and remains in existing 
conflict with the Northern part. Women who live in Southern Yemen are 45% less 
likely to vote than women who are from the capital exp(-.597)=0.55. However, 
women who live in the East, West, or Northern parts of Yemen are more likely to 
vote than women who live in the capital. Men who live in Southern Yemen in 
particular are 89% less likely to vote than men who live in the capital. However, men 
who live anywhere display no significant levels of variation.   
Indicated only in the Yemeni sample, women who feel completely free to 
leave the house are 30% less likely to vote than women who do not exp(-.348)=.70. 
This is likely a function of geography and a reduced connection to tribal politics and 
clientelist politics. Unlike many countries, in the Yemeni context, real political power 
is not held in the capital, but by tribal leaders, who are located outside of the capital. 
In these areas, tribal leaders connect with male heads of the household, who then 
mobilize family members of voting age to go the polls in return for social services. 
The regional distribution of this sentiment is uneven across Yemen, with those in the 
South feeling the least amount of pressure to vote at all (12%), and those in the East 
(the region with the strongest tribal presence) feeling the most amount of pressure to 
vote (29%). According to this dataset, women who indicated that they felt pressured 





were not.20  In the capital, where tribal links are reduced, the pressure to vote is less 
(20%), and thus, the relationship to political participation is weakened.  
 Among men, those who are married are over two times more likely to vote 
than men are not exp(.825)=2.25. Men who have achieved university education are 
nearly four times more likely to vote than men who did not exp(1.36)=3.89. Men who 
assert an interest in politics are 83% more likely to vote than men who do not 
exp(.608)=1.83. Among both sexes, there is a positive relationship between age and 
the propensity to vote.  
In discussion the raw decomposition between the two models, the Ω-
characteristic value of women is -.067; it appears as though women would be 
predicted to vote less given the resources that they have. Similarly, the Ω-
characteristic value of men is -.025, indicating that men would also be predicted to 
vote less given their resources. In terms of the Ω-coefficients, the Ω coefficient for 
women is -.165, while the Ω coefficient for men is -.206. The calculated raw 
differential is -0.232. In spite of the fact that both sexes vote more than they are 
predicted to, it appears that men vote more than women do in the Yemeni context. 
Indeed, 83 percent of men vote in comparison to 58 percent of women, and having 
performed a t-test, this is a statistically significant difference with a p-value of 
0.0001.  
                                                 
20 Originally, the question pertaining to pressure to vote was asked only of women who had already 
indicated that they had voted. In order to obtain enough variation in the data to allow me to run binary 
logistic regression and test the significance, I bootstrapped this variable and ran it 25 times in order to 





 Rather than following the trend indicated in the Lebanese, American, and 
Moroccan contexts, these results indicate that feeling free to leave the home actually 
demobilizes women. At first glance, this would appear as though violations of bodily 
integrity are unrelated to political demobilization in the Yemeni context. However, 
this is untrue. Indicated below, the demobilizing effects of incursions on personal 

























Table 11: Relationship between Marital Partnership Power Dynamics and 
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Constant .296 .398 
Pseudo R-Sq 0.0180   0.0450 
 n=1051 n=810 
Note: Dependent variable is whether or not one voted in the elections  





In Yemen, the inability to control decisions over one’s body demobilizes 
female voting. Women are 55% less likely to vote if their husbands have absolute 
control over their ability to seek medical care compared to women who make this 
decision independently exp(-.790)=.450. Similarly, when the decision is joint, women 
are 71% less likely to vote than women who have control over receiving medical care 
exp(-1.21)=.29. The lack of control over one’s body, though not in the context of 
mobility, demobilizes women politically.  Interestingly, women are 2.4 times more 
likely to vote if they own property compared to women who do not at 95% 
significance exp(.911)=2.4. As discussed in other chapters, this likely due to the 
empowerment mechanisms behind individual command over resources. 
In both of these models, it appears as though ownership over property 
enhances a woman’s likelihood to vote. In Morocco, women who own property are 
53% more likely to vote than women who do not at 90% significance exp(.427)=1.53.  
Interestingly, spousal control over social interactions within the home 
depresses the female propensity to vote likelihood in Morocco. If the husband has 
exclusive control as to whether or not guests can come over, women are 52% less 
likely to vote than women who control social interactions within the home exp(-
.715)=.48. In many ways, this is the inverted side of spousal control over mobility 
outside of the home, as control over who comes in the home effectively controls 
whom the woman can interact with. Indeed, it appears as though women are less 
likely to vote if their mobility outside of the home is controlled, or if their social life 







In comparing all four countries—Lebanon, Morocco, Yemen, and the United 
States, it appears as though lacking independent control over one’s body (largely but 
not exclusively in the form of independent mobility) is the linking demobilizing 
factor among women. Interestingly, the justification of domestic violence did not 
prove to be statistically significant among any of the four countries, leading to the 
conclusion that psychological control over one’s daily routine is more demobilizing 
than episodes of violence. Such a lack of control results in reduced confidence, 
independent decision-making skills, and limited ability to interact with others, which 
ultimately leads to less public participation  
Ultimately, it appears that across the spectrum of legal and social spaces 
accorded to women, transgressions upon personal space demobilize women. In 
countries where women have the liberty to move freely, this in the form of control 
over mobility outside of the home. In heavily restrictive countries such as Yemen 
where control spousal control over mobility is legal and pressure to vote is high, this 
is obvious in the form of the ability to make decisions about one’s body, such as the 
ability to secure medical care. While the study conducted in the U.S. indicates that 
perceptions of transgressions about personal space also demobilize men, further 
research would include examining such social trends among men, and to see if these 







Chapter 6: Mobilizing Bodies: Protecting Women and 
Democracy 
 
In the last chapter, Bodily Transgressions and Voter Demobilization: The 
Cases of Morocco and Yemen, I illustrate how violations of bodily integrity 
demobilize voters, though these violations are different. In Morocco, women who do 
not feel free to leave the house experience voter demobilization. In Yemen, spousal 
control over mobility does not demobilize women politically in Yemen, but spousal 
control over the ability to seek medical attention does. Moreover, education and 
employment do not empower women politically in Morocco, but they do in Yemen.  
In this chapter, Mobilizing Bodies: Protecting Women and Democracy, I 
discuss the theoretical and practical policy implications that these four cases present. 
Ultimately, it appears that violations of bodily integrity demobilize voters across 
regions and political structures, implying that this dimension of capability space 
should be more incorporated into the study of electoral behavior. 
My central hypothesis is that violations of personal space result in decreased 
capability space, which leads to voter demobilization. I assert this to be true across 
regions, cultures, and political systems. As a result, I chose to examine Lebanon and 
the United States, with a comparative focus on Morocco and Yemen. In all four 
instances, the demobilizing effect of violations of bodily integrity upon voting 
behavior was apparent, and much more so among women than among men.  
In the Lebanese context, violations of personal space demobilized female 





domination of women; Christian women were more likely to experience sexual 
harassment in the street, while Muslim women were more likely to have their 
mobility restricted by family members. Both led to political demobilization among 
female voters. The empowerment mechanisms of education, an interest in politics, 
and employment significantly increase the propensity to vote among women, as does 
property ownership. Among men, the most significant predictors of voting are 
marriage and membership in a political party. Significant for both sexes is regular 
exposure to political media. Ultimately though, it appears as though women are more 
sensitive to both violations of bodily integrity and the positive effects of education, 
empowerment, and an interest in politics. 
Along a similar vein, American women are also demobilized politically when 
their mobility is restricted by their spouses/significant others, while university-level 
education empowers women politically. Interestingly, higher levels of total household 
income (rather than independent employment) empower women politically. In both 
countries, neither education, employment, nor higher levels of income increase the 
propensity to vote among men. Interestingly though, American men are also less 
likely to vote when due to violations of personal space, although this manifests itself 
through exposure to domestic violence. Moreover, non-Democratic affiliation 
decreases the propensity for men to vote, but partisanship does not affect women. 
Unlike the Lebanese context where an interest in politics increases the propensity to 






Unique to Morocco, neither education nor employment empowers women to 
mobilize politically. This is most likely due to the fact that a significant proportion of 
female employment in Morocco occurs within the home, and does not afford benefits 
outside of direct cash payment. As such, the public circulation mechanisms that are 
linked to employment do not apply. However, the belief that women should work 
outside of the home does increase the likelihood to vote, as this concept is by 
definition, in support of public participation. 
 The factors most likely to lead women to polls are having an interest in 
politics, marriage, and an increase in age. Unique to this particular election, persons 
of Berber minority status were more likely to vote, as campaigning for legislation 
related to the official use of the Berber language (which would later be decided by 
parliamentary referendum) during this election. Similar to the Lebanese and 
American cases, women in Morocco are less likely to vote if they experience familial 
restraints on their mobility. 
Among Moroccan men, an interest in politics does not increase the propensity 
to vote, which is a similar result to their Lebanese counterparts. However, 
employment increases the likelihood to vote among Moroccan men. Interestingly, 
education does not prove to be a significant empowering factor in the propensity to 
vote among either Moroccan men or women. An explanation for this could be the 
driving factor leading voters to the polls is not the empowering factors of education, 
but the mechanisms of clientelist distributive politics. 
 Among the four cases, Yemen is the only case where the consent of a male 





this is the one case where feeling free to leave the home reduces the likelihood to 
vote. This is likely a function of geography and pressure to vote, as most political 
power is held in tribal areas, where constraints on female mobility are the most severe 
and political participation is determined by familial choice in reward for goods or 
services. However, the inability to choose when to seek healthcare demobilizes 
women politically. This too is linked to the broader concept of bodily integrity, as the 
inability to choose what is best for one’s body is indicative of deprived agency. 
   Similar to the Lebanese case, experiencing university-level education and 
employment significantly propel Yemeni women into political participation, as does 
regular exposure to political media. The belief that women should work and the 
freedom to express one’s self also increases the likelihood to vote among Yemeni 
women. Among Yemeni men, marriage, education, and the freedom to associate with 
others increases the likelihood to vote. The propensity to vote increases with age 
among both sexes.  
 Unique to Yemeni history is the story of division and reunification. In order to 
analyze how this dynamic effects voting behavior, I broke up each region and 
compared it to the capital. I found that those whom are from Southern Yemen (an 
independent state until 1990) are the least likely to vote, while those from politically 
dominant areas are the most likely to vote.  
 It is clear that violations of personal space, largely in the form of control over 
mobility, demobilize voters in either democratic or democratizing settings. In 
autocracies such as Yemen, however, the relationship is less clear. Control over 





However, violations of bodily integrity in form of control over the ability to seek 
healthcare) demobilize female voters in Yemen. This could indicate that the 
demobilizing effects of violations of personal space present themselves differently in 
a space where female mobility is legally controlled, but future research on voting 
behavior in autocracies would provide more insight as to the relationship between 
violations of personal space and voting behavior.  
The Demobilized Body in Electoral Politics 
This research introduces the necessity of incorporating non-resource based 
elements to the analysis of voting behavior to the field of electoral politics. Political 
scientists have often used education, income, and employment as indicators of social 
resources which increase one’s public and political participation. Race and gender are 
often used as determinants of social cleavage while examining voting behavior. 
However, electoral politics has failed to acknowledge that these are subsets of a wider 
set of capabilities which determine what a person is able to do and become. These 
elements are: poverty, education, employment, leisure time, legal rights, social status, 
and respect for bodily integrity (Nussbaum, 2003; Robeyns, 2003; Sen, 2001). These 
form a holistic assessment of a person’s “capability space” (Nussbaum, 2003). The 
concept of one’s personal capability space is one that is largely grounded in human 
development. 
This dissertation takes the elements of the capability space from the broader 
human capability framework and uses them to analyze political behavior.  Using 





space demobilize voters. Moreover, they do so in a fashion that is not only cross-
regional, but across multiple varieties of governmental systems.  
This relationship is salient in the United States, which has a strong history of 
democracy, secular governance, and equal rights between the sexes. Violations of 
personal space also demobilize voter in Lebanon, which has a history of political 
conflict, where elections are irregular, where men and women do not have equal 
rights, and the legal system imposes religious law in matters pertaining to family law. 
The same relationship is found in Morocco, which is recently transitioned from an 
absolute to a constitutional monarchy, and is in the process of democratization. Here 
too, men and women do not have equal rights, and there are elements of both secular 
and religious law in the Moroccan legal space. Lastly, this relationship takes on a 
unique flavor—but still one that is relevant—in Yemen, where an ongoing military 
coup directs the country towards a very uncertain future, where women face heavy 
legal restrictions, and democracy is not salient. Ultimately, indicates that the 
functions of the capability space as they affect the propensity to vote behave similarly 
within and across cultures, regions, and governmental structures.  
The Demobilized Body in Public Policy 
The practical implications of the findings of this dissertation intertwine around 
the relationship between voting behavior and policies related to education, 
employment and the protection of bodily integrity. It is clear that familial control over 
mobility decreases the ability to vote, while mechanisms of empowerment, education 
and employment increase the propensity for women to vote in all countries but 





It appears as though these mechanisms, particularly when linked with formal 
institutions, increase the propensity to vote. Not only to education and employment 
allow for the development of civic skills, allow for increased exposure to the public 
sphere, more awareness about political discussions, and enhance the availability of 
political resources, but they also allow for increased independent agency. This limits 
the ability of one spouse to control the movements of another, which by extension, 
reduces the subservient role that inhibits independent decision-making and public 
participation. Ways to increase the propensity of women to experience employment 
and education include creating scholarship funds that particularly target women, or 
creating institutional policies that incentivize employers to hire women, and to raise 
the wages of typically feminine jobs. These policies would allow women to ease into 
the public sphere. 
Perhaps more importantly though, violations of personal space are often 
grounded in resource inequality. Typically, women who are dominated in the home 
are often younger, have less education, and are less likely to be employed. Increasing 
the accessibility of such resources often translates into higher levels of respect for 
bodily integrity.  Creating policies that would incentivize employers to hire women 
and would reduce resource inequality, and by extension, violations of bodily integrity. 
 Moreover, there needs to be an increase of female politicians in legislative 
branches who work on gender issues. Policy measures would be to diversify the 
political platforms where women are discussed, and in the Lebanese, Moroccan, and 





conditions for an increased likelihood in political participation, and allow for voices 
that were once not heard to be given their full due. 
 By that same token, recommendations such as these should be make within 
the context of the political environment of the case studies. In 2014, the Houthi 
insurgency took over the presidential palace, leading to the ouster of President 
Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi in early 2015 (Gasim, 2015). At this point, Yemen is 
experiencing violent political conflict not only between Houthi rebels and those who 
are loyal to the regime, but also with ISIS (Al-Mosawa, Fahim, and Schmitt, 2015). 
In Lebanon, rivalry between the March 8th and March 14th coalitions has led 
to the failure of parliament to elect a president, as the March 8th camp continues to 
boycott attending presidential elections in parliament (Samaha and Chugtai, 2015). 
Undermining the concept of democracy, these tactics have led to a void in the 
presidential office for nearly two years. Lebanon is also dealing with an influx of 
approximately 2 million Syrian refugees, which has led to decreased provision of 
social services, increased levels of poverty, and increasing levels of political violence 
from Syrian rebels fighting from Lebanese territory (Fernandez, 2015). 
In Morocco, substantial political change has occurred since 2010. In response 
to Moroccan protestors, Morocco transformed its style of governance from that of an 
absolute monarchy to that of a constitutional one (Masbah, 2015). The Islamist 
opposition Party of Justice and Development has a plurality in parliament, and the 
government has allowed Moroccan citizens increased civil freedom in the form of 





appropriate to characterize Morocco as a country that is transitioning into democracy, 
rather than one where democratic transition has been solidified. 
At this point, it appears as though heavy political unrest is dominating the 
region in the wake of the Arab Spring, leaving existing political structures little room 
to accommodate for new political discourses, or create substantive reformatory policy 
(Abdo, 2016). Ultimately, gender-conscious politicians will not emerge without an 
existing space to do so. Changing the socio-political sphere such that it 
accommodates gender-based concerns require widespread activism, lobbying, and 
reform at the level of the citizen. These activities are by definition, executed by those 
who are mobilized politically, and such mobilization often extends beyond the 
propensity to vote. Indeed, increased voting may not immediately lead to increased 
levels of gender equality and empowerment. 
Though this study does indicate that education and employment increases the 
propensity to vote, it does not definitively state that education and employment lead 
to an increase in the capability space, which reduces incursions on bodily integrity. It 
is entirely possible that women who have access to these resources have more 
freedom at home, and are less likely to experience dominance over their mobility to 
begin with. Directions for future research include a longitudinal study whereby 
women experience empowerment programs, and then report levels of incursion on 
bodily integrity, along with the propensity to participate politically.   
   Lastly, given that this dissertation is grounded in heteronormative 
assumptions, it would be worthwhile to see if the same dynamics exist in homosexual 





minority, further examination as to whether or not political demobilization comes 
from sexual regulations unique to the LGBTQ community or those similar to those in 
heterosexual relationships would be a contribution to both electoral studies and 







Appendix 1: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in 
the Lebanese Case Study 
Variables Description Coding 
Vote The dependent variable asking 
respondents if they had voted in 
the previous elections 
1=Yes 
0=No 




 Captures total income. It is logged 
in order to normalize the 
distribution. 
Varies across datasets 
Married Asking about the respondent’s 
marital status.  
1=Married   
0=Single  
Employed  Asking the respondent if they had 





News TV  Asking the respondent often they 
follow local T.V.  
Originally an ordinal level 
variable, following the news 
once a week or more was 
coded as 1, and less was coded 
as 0. 
Interest in Politics  Asking the respondent about their  
interest in politics. 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Free to Associate  Asking women if they feel free to 
associate with person of their 
choosing. 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Express 
Thoughts 
Asking women if they feel free to 
express their thoughts. 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Experience of Sexual 
Harassment 
Asking women how often they are 
sexually harassed. 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Women who 
reported “Nearly all the 
time/Most of the 
time/Sometimes” were coded 
as one, while anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Leave the 
House 
 Asking women if they feel free to 
leave the house without the 
permission of family members. 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 





was coded as 0. 
Free to Move Publicly 
without fear 
Asking women if they feel free to 
circulate without fear in public 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Some University 
Education 
Indicating whether or not the 
respondent has received some 
university education 
1=Yes 




 Indicating whether or not the 
respondent has completed their 
bachelor’s degree or higher.  
1=Yes  





Indicating whether or not the 
respondent believes that gender-






Indicating whether or not the 
respondent would allow his/her 
daughter work outside of the home 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Greek Orthodox A dummied out variable  




Greek Catholic  A dummied out variable in  




Armenian Christian  A dummied out variable  




Christian Minorities  A dummied out variable 




Sunni Muslim A dummied out variable 




Shi’ite Muslim A dummied out variable 




Other Muslim  A dummied out variable  




Domestic Violence A dummied out variable in 
response to an open-ended 
question as to why the respondent 
thinks domestic violence occurs.  
1=Because she deserved it 
0=All other reasons 
 
 
V/E Abuse A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent experiences 
verbal/emotional abuse at home 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Support Self A binary variable indicating as to 




Independent Savings A binary variable indicating as to 








Property Ownership A binary variable indicating as to 




Decision to visit 
family 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to seek 
medical care 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 





Decision to make 
daily home purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to make Big 
Purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision as to 
whether or not to 
invite guests into the 
home 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 






















Appendix 2: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in 
the American Case Study 
Variables Description Coding 
Vote The dependent variable asking 
respondents if they had voted in 
the previous elections 
1=Yes 
0=No 




 Captures total income. It is logged 
in order to normalize the 
distribution. 
Varies across datasets 
Ln(Age) Captures age in years. It is logged 
in order to normalize the 
distribution. 
Varies across datasets 
Married Asking about the respondent’s 
marital status.  
1=Married   
0=Single  
Employed  Asking the respondent if they had 





News TV  Asking the respondent often they 
follow local T.V.  
Originally an ordinal level 
variable, following the news 
once a week or more was 
coded as 1, and less was coded 
as 0. 
Interest in Politics  Asking the respondent about their  
interest in politics. 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Free to Associate  Asking if respondents feel free to 
associate with person of their 
choosing. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Express 
Thoughts 
Asking if respondents feel free to 
express their thoughts. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Leave the 
House 
 Created as a vignette, the question 
read asked which one of these 
phrases is most representative of 
an interaction between the 
respondent and their 
spouse/significant other. The 
options were: 
 a) “I am going to see my friend—
see you in a bit, honey!” 
b) “I am going to see my friend—
is that alright with you?” 
c) “I would like to see my friend. 
Is that alright with you?” 
d)May I make plans to see my 
friend, please?” 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Option (a) was coded 








 Indicating whether or not 
 the respondent has completed 
their bachelor’s degree or higher.  
1=Yes  
0=No University Education 
 
Justification of Male-
to Female Violence 
Indicating whether or not the 
respondent believes that Male-to-






Indicating whether or not the 
respondent believes that Female-









Hispanic A nominal variable indicating 
whether or not the respondent is 
Spanish, or has Hispanic ancestry. 
2=Did not answer 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Emotional Abuse A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent experiences 
verbal/emotional abuse at home 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Republican A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 




Independent A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent is unaffiliated 
1=Yes 
0=Democrat 
Former Member of a 
Political Party 
A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent is a former member of 
a political party 
1=Yes 
0= Current member of a 
political party 
Never a Member of a 
political party 
A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent had never joined a 
political party 
1=Yes 
0= Current member of a 
political party 
Sexual Harassment A dummy variable asking how 
often the respondent is sexually 
harassed in the street. 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Women who 
reported “Nearly all the 
time/Most of the 
time/Sometimes” were coded 
as one, while anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Region A nominal variable indicating the 
regional grouping of the 
respondents state. These were  
classified according to census 
bureau divisions. The South 
included: Delaware, Washington 
D.C., Florida, Georgia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, 









Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma 
and Texas. The Northeast included 
Connecticut, Maine, 
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont, New 
Jersey, New York, and 
Pennsylvania. The Midwest 
included Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, 
Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, North Dakota and South 
Dakota. The West includes 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, 
Utah, Wyoming, Alaska, 
California, Hawaii, Oregon and 
Washington. 
 
Property Ownership A dummy variable asking whether 




Support Self A dummy variable asking whether 
or not the respondent can support 
themselves independently of 
his/her spouse or significant other 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Decision to visit 
family 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to seek 
medical care 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 





Decision to make 
daily home purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to make Big 
Purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision as to 
whether or not to 
invite guests into the 
home 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 














Appendix 3: Coding Scheme for the Dependent and Independent Variables in 
the Moroccan and Yemeni Case Studies 
Variables Description Coding 
Vote The dependent variable asking 
respondents if they had voted in 
the previous elections 
1Yes 
0=No 




 Captures total income. It is logged 
in order to normalize the 
distribution. 
Varies across datasets 
Married Asking about the respondent’s 
marital status.  
1=Married   
0=Single  
Employed  Asking the respondent if they had 





News TV  Asking the respondent often they 
follow local T.V.  
Originally an ordinal level 
variable, following the news 
once a week or more was 
coded as 1, and less was coded 
as 0. 
Interest in Politics  Asking the respondent about their  
interest in politics. 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Free to Associate  Asking women if they feel free to 
associate with person of their 
choosing. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Express 
Thoughts 
Asking women if they feel free to 
express their thoughts. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Experience of Sexual 
Harassment 
Asking how often women 
experience sexual harassment 
Originally coded as an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Women who 
reported “Nearly all the 
time/Most of the 
time/Sometimes” were coded 
as one, while anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Leave the 
House 
 Asking women if they feel free to 
leave the house without 
permission from family members. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 
collapsed into a binary 
variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Free to Move Publicly Asking women if they feel free to 
move around in public without 
fear. 
Originally coded an ordinal 
level variable, this was 





variable. Completely free was 
coded as 1, and anything less 
was coded as 0. 
Some University 
Education 
Indicating whether or not the 
respondent has received some 
university education 
1=Yes 




 Indicating whether or not the 
respondent has completed their 
bachelor’s degree or higher.  
1=Yes  




Indicating whether or not the 
respondent would allow his/her 
daughter work outside of the home 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Berber A dummied out variable indicating 
whether or not the respondent 





A dummied out variable 
comparing Southern Yemen to 





A dummied out variable 
comparing Western Yemen to 





A dummied out variable 
comparing Eastern Yemen to 





A dummied out variable 
comparing Northern Yemen to 
Sana’a, the capital 
1=Northern Region 
0=Capital 
Alone (Yemen) A dummied out variable 
comparing the whether or not 
women in Yemen were alone 
during the interview or not 
1=Yes 
0=Maronite Christian 
Other Muslim  A dummied out variable  







A dummied out variable in 
response to an open-ended 
question as to why the respondent 
thinks domestic violence occurs.  
1=Because she deserved it 
0=All other reasons 
 
 
V/E Abuse A dummied out variable indicating 
as to whether or not the 
respondent experiences 
verbal/emotional abuse at home 
1=Yes 
0=No 
Support Self A binary variable indicating as to 




Property Ownership A binary variable indicating as to 




Decision to visit 
family 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to seek 
medical care 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 









Decision to make 
daily home purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision to make Big 
Purchases 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 




Decision as to 
whether or not to 
invite guests into the 
home 
A variable indicating whose 
decision it is within the marriage 










Appendix 4: Graphs of the Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the 
Propensity to Vote Across Income Levels in Lebanon and Morocco 
 
 
Figure 7: Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the Propensity to 
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Note: Figure 7 describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across the natural 
logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the 





















Figure 8: Marginal Effects of Control Over Mobility on the Propensity to 
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Note: Figure 8 describes the marginal effect on leaving the house on voting across the natural 
logarithm of income levels, comparing those who report that they feel completely free to leave the 














Appendix 5.A: Full Questionnaire for Transgressions Against Personal Space 
and Voting Behavior in the United States. 
 
Introduction:  You are being invited to participate in a survey concerning public 
policy issues in the United States. Participation in this survey is entirely voluntary—if 
at any point in time you would like to stop, feel free to do so. 
 
Screener Questions 










Q.3 What is your gender? 
a)  Female 
b)  Male 
 






















Q.7. What is your living arrangement?  
a) Live Alone 
b) Live with your Spouse 
c) Live with your Significant other 
d) Live with your Parents  
e) Live with Roommates 
f) Other (please specify) 
 




Q.9. (If Working only): In what type of business are you employed? (Check other 
survey) 
a) Agriculture 


































1 2 3 
B. Visits to family, 
friends, or 
relatives 
1 2 3 
C. Inviting guests 
to your home 1 2 3 
D. Taking a child 
to the doctor 1 2 3 
E. Getting medical 
advice/treatment 
for yourself 
1 2 3 
F. Whether to 
punish children 
for misbehaving 





Q.11. Do you personally have…? 
 
 Yes No 
A. Financial savings in your 
name 1 2 
B. Land or real estate with the 







Q.12. If you no longer were able to depend on your spouse’s/significant other’s 







Asked of All Respondents 
 
Politics 
Q.13.  How interested are you in matters of politics? 
a) Very interested 
b) Somewhat interested 
c) Not too interested 
d) Not at all interested 
 
Q.14. Did you vote in the 2012 presidential elections?  
a) Yes  
b) No 
 
Q. 15. (If yes):  Which presidential candidate did you vote for? 
a) Barack Obama 
b) Mitt Romney 
 
Q.16. (If no): Kindly indicate why you did not vote (please check all that apply). 
(a) Not a registered voter 
(b) Was working 
(b) Did not want to 
(c) Polls are far away 









Q. 17. When voting in presidential elections, which are the top three most important 
factors that influence your choice? Please rank them.   
a) Candidates party identification 
b) Candidates’ platform 
c) Candidates’ earlier performance 
d) Candidates stance on economic issues 
e) Candidates’ stance on issues of importance to women 
f) Candidates’ stance on issues significant to my ethnic group 
g) My family or friends always vote for/like these candidates 
h) Other, specify……………………………………………………….. 
  
Q.18. (If respondent voted): When you voted, did you go to the polls alone, or with 
someone else?  
a) Alone 
b) Someone else 
 
 
Q.19. (If respondent went with someone else):  With whom did you go?  
a) Spouse 
b) Parent/s 
c) Other Family Member(s) 
d) Friend/s 




Q.20. (If respondent voted): When making your decision on whom to vote for in the 
November 2012 Presidential elections, did you feel obliged to vote for a particular 
party/candidate?  
a) I felt extremely pressured to vote for a particular party/candidate 
  
b) I felt somewhat pressured to vote for a particular party/candidate 
c) I felt fairly free to vote for whomever I wanted   






Q.21. (If respondent voted): If you were pressured to vote, kindly indicate anyone 
who pressured you to vote a certain way (please check all that apply).  
a) Father 
b) Mother 
c) Husband  
d) Wife 






k) Other, specify……………………………………………. 
 
 







Q.23. Are you a member or have been a member of any of the different types of 
organizations listed below? 







Trade union/Professional syndicate 1 2 3 
Political party 1 2 3 
Religious group 1 2 3 
Charity organization 1 2 3 
Family association 1 2 3 


















Contacted or visited a 
public official – at any 
level of government – to 
express your opinion  
1 2 3 4 
Called in to a radio or 
television talk show to 
express your opinion on a 
political or social issue 
1 2 3 4 
Signed a written or email 
petition  
1 2 3 
      4 
Contributed to a political 
campaign 
1 2 3 
      4 
Taken part in a protest, 
march, or demonstration 
1 2 3 
      4 
Contributed to a blog or 
internet site to express 
your opinion on a political 
or social issue 
1 2 3 
        
      4 
Written to a newspaper or 
magazine to express your 
opinion on a political or 
social issue 
1 2 3 
     















Limited Trust Do not Trust 
The President 1 2 3 4 
Congress 1 2 3 4 
The Supreme 
Court  
1 2 3 4 
The Media 1 2 3 4 
The Military 1 2 3 4 
 
 
Q. 26. Refocus question:  
 




Asked of those who are married or in a relationship only. 
Q.27. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between couples. Kindly 
indicate which one is most representative of you when interacting with your 
significant other.  
a) “I am going to see my friend—see you in a bit, honey!” 
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?” 
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?” 
d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?” 
 
Asked of those who are living with their parents only. 
Q.28. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between parents and 
their adult children. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of you when 
interacting with your mom.  
a) “I am going to see my friend—see you!” 
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?” 
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?” 







Q.29. Below are a series of phrases indicating an interaction between parents and 
their adult children. Kindly indicate which one is most representative of you when 
interacting with your dad.  
a) “I am going to see my friend—see you!” 
b) “I am going to see my friend—is that alright with you?” 
c) “I would like to see my friend. Is that alright with you?” 
d) “May I make plans to see my friend, please?” 
 
Asked of those who are married or in a relationship only. 
Q.30. Below are a series of vignettes between couples. Kindly indicate which one is 
most representative of an interaction in your relationship. 
a. “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card bill. 
He reminded her to pay the bill on time for the next cycle.” 
b.  “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card 
bill. He took a tone with her, and asked her why she had to be so stupid.” 
c. “Mark got upset with Cindy because she forgot to pay off their credit card bill. 
He slapped her.” 
d. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. 
She reminded him to pay the bill on time for the next cycle.” 
e. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. 
She took a tone with him, and asked him why he had to be so stupid.” 
f. “Cindy got upset with Mark because he forgot to pay off their credit card bill. 






















Asked only of those who are married, in a relationship, or living with parents. 
Q.31.  
 
To what extent are 











persons of your 
own choosing 
1 2 3 4 
B 
Expressing your 
views on critical 












1 2 3 4 
D 
Moving about in 
public areas 
without fear or 
pressure 
1 2 3 4 
E 
Associating with 
persons of your 
choosing 
1 2 3 4 
 
Asked of All Respondents 
Q.32. When you are in public spaces (local markets, walking down the street, waiting 
at metro stations or bus stops, etc.), how often would you say that someone makes 
unwanted/sexually suggestive noises, comments, or gestures toward you?  
a) Often 
b) Sometimes 











Q. 33. When you are in public spaces, how often would you say that someone 
touches, pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?  
a) Often 
b) Sometimes 




Q.34. When you are at work, how often would you say that someone makes 
unwanted/sexually suggestive noises, comments, or gestures toward you?  
a) Often 
b) Sometimes 






Q. 35. When you are at work, how often would you say that someone touches, 
pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?  
a) Often 
b) Sometimes 






Q. 36. When using public transport, how often would you say that someone touches, 
pinches, or make otherwise unwelcome physical contact with you?  
a) Often 
b) Sometimes 




Q.37. When using public transport, how often would you say that someone makes 











Q. 38. Living with a spouse or significant other can be difficult, and such a lifestyle is 
not without its disagreements. These disagreements can lead to instances of domestic 
violence. When incidents of domestic violence occur, why do you think they happen? 
 
 






Q.39. Below are a list of explanations pertaining to domestic violence directed from 
men to women. Kindly rank them in order of your preference, 1 being the most likely 
explanation, 7 being the least likely. 
 
1  Because of poverty/financial stress 
2 Because the wife provoked it 
3 Because of low educational levels 
4 Because of cultural reasons/ accepted in certain communities or 
traditions/ some people are raised this way 
5 Because the aggressor suffers from a mental condition/psychological 
problem 
6 Because of substance abuse 





Q.40. Below are a list of explanations pertaining to domestic violence directed from 
women to men. Kindly rank them in order of your preference, 1 being the most likely 







1  Because of poverty/financial stress 
2 Because the husband provoked the incident 
3 Because of low educational levels 
4 Because of cultural reasons/ accepted in certain communities or 
traditions/ some people are raised this way 
5 Because the aggressor suffers from a mental condition/psychological 
problem 
6 Because of substance abuse 






Q. 41. In each of these types of situations, please indicate your views on the 








A. If she neglected household 
responsibilities? 
1 2 3 
B. If she neglected the children? 1 2 3 
C. If she went out without telling 
her spouse/significant other? 
1 2 3 
















Media Outlet Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely Never 
Television 1 2 3 4 5 
      Newspapers (paper 
or online) 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Magazines (paper or 
online) 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Radio 1 2 3 4 5 
Social Media Websites 1 2 3 4 5 
Word of mouth 1 2 3 4 5 
 
 
Q. 43. (If word of mouth is used either daily or weekly). Kindly rank the top three 
persons from whom you obtain such information.  
a) Father 
b) Mother 
c) Husband  
d) Wife 






k) Other (please specify) 
 
 
For those who are married/in relationships only.  
 
Q. 44. A Harvard study indicates that arguments about politics lead to shorter 














Q. 45. Imagine the scenario that you and your spouse/significant other get into a 
heated argument over the presidential candidate for whom you are going to vote the 
night before the election. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is the likelihood that you would 
change your voting preference? 
 
Very Likely      Likely        Somewhat Likely         Unlikely           Highly Unlikely   
         1                  2                          3                             4                            5    
 
 




Very Likely      Likely        Somewhat Likely         Unlikely           Highly Unlikely   
         1                  2                          3                             4                            5    
 
 
Q. 47. Imagine the scenario that you and your spouse/significant other get into a 
heated argument over the presidential candidate for whom you are going to vote the 
night before the election. On a scale of 1 to 5, what is the likelihood that your 
spouse/significant other would change his/her voting preference? 
 
 
Very Likely      Likely        Somewhat Likely         Unlikely           Highly Unlikely   






Q. 48. What is the likelihood that your spouse/significant other would abstain from 
voting owing to the disagreement?  
 
 
Very Likely      Likely        Somewhat Likely         Unlikely           Highly Unlikely   















For all respondents 
 
Q. 49. Below is a list of statements. For each one, please indicate to what extent you 
agree or disagree with each. 









A. People like me can have 
influence on decisions 
made by the 
government. 
1 2 3 4 
B. Voting gives people like 
me a chance to influence 
decision-making in our 
country. 
















A. Women as members of 
political parties 1 2 3 4 
B. Women serving in the 
Senate or the House 1 2 3 4 
C. Women working for a 
candidate during a 
campaign   
1 2 3 4 
D. A woman as president 1 2 3 4 
E. Women participating in 
political protests 1 2 3 4 





own choice as to whom 









Q. 51. For each statement, please indicate whether you strongly agree, somewhat 











A. Women and girls 
should have equal 
access to education as 
men and boys 
1 2 3 4 
B. Women should have 
equal work 
opportunities as men 
1 2 3 4 
C. When jobs are scarce, 
men should have more 
right to a job than 
women 
















Q.52. How often do you… 
Practice Daily Weekly Monthly Rarely Never 
Pray 1 2 3 4 5 
Fast for religious 
purposes 
1 2 3 4 
5 
Watch or listen to 
religious programs 




1 2 3 4 
5 
Read religious texts  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Q. 53. To ensure that we still have your attention, please select the option “agree to 
continue.” 
a) Strongly Disagree 
b) Disagree 
c) Neither Agree nor Disagree 
d) Agree 




Q.54. Who is the current Vice-President of the United States at present? 
---------------------------------------------------(please indicate answer)  
 






--------------------------------------------------(please indicate answer) 
 
 
Q. 56. Who is the current secretary of state?  
----------------------------------------------------(please indicate answer)  
 
 
Q. 57. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:  
“A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” 
a) Strongly Agree 
b) Somewhat Agree 
c) Somewhat Disagree 
d) Disagree 
e) Strongly Disagree 
 
Respondent Demographics 





Q.59. How old are you? 












Q. 61. Do you live in a:  
a) City 
b) Suburb 








Q. 63. If so, kindly indicate the religion you identify with. 
a) Buddhism 






h) Other (please specify) 
 
Q.64. Do you identify with a particular ethnic group?  
a) Yes 
b) No  
 
If Yes to Q. 64 
 









If Yes to Q.64 but no to Q. 65 
 
Q. 66. Do you come from or have ancestry based in an Arabic-speaking country?  
     a) Yes 






If yes to Q. 64 
 
Q. 67. Kindly indicate which group you identify with. 
 
     a) White 
     b) Black or African American 
     c) American Indian or Alaska Native 
     d) Indian 
     e) Chinese 
     f) Filipino 
     g) Japanese 
     h)  Korean 
     i) Vietnamese 
     j)  Other Asian 
     k) Native Hawaiian 
     l)  Guamanian or Chamorro 
    m) Samoan 
    n) Other Pacific Islander 
    o)  Another race (please specify) 
 
Q.68. What is the highest educational level that you have completed and received 
credit for?  
a) Primary education (completed grade 6) 
b) Intermediate education (completed grade 8)  
c) High school degree 
d) Associate’s Deegree 
e) Bachelor’s degree  
f) Post-graduate-level degree (such as Master’s or Ph.D.) 
 
Q.69. What is your best estimate of how much you usually earn annually from all 





 a) Below $20,000 
            b)  $20,000-$29,999 
            c) $30,000--$39,999 
            d) $40,000-$49,999  
            e) $50,000-$59,999 
            f) $60,000-$69,999 
            g) $70,000-$79,999 
            h) $80,000-$89,999 




 Q.70. What is your best estimate of your total annual household income in dollars?  
 
            a) Below $30,000 
            b)  $20,000-$29,999 
            c) $30,000--$39,999 
            d) $40,000-$49,999  
            e) $50,000-$59,999 
            f) $60,000-$69,999 
            g) $70,000-$79,999 
            h) $80,000-$89,999 
            i) $90,000-$99,999 






























Appendix 5.B: Over-Reporting Political Participation in American Sample 
 
 
Table 12: Over-Reporting Voter Turnout in the American Sample Among Men 
 
Voter Turnout Married Men Unmarried Men 
Did Not Vote 7.1% 26.1% 





Table 13: Over-Reporting Political Affiliation in the American Sample 
 
Political Affiliation Men Women 
Democrat 35.95% 41.18% 
Republican 26.43% 25.45% 
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